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entity—called a third-party funder—finances the legal representation of a party involved in 
litigation or arbitration or finances a law firm’s portfolio of cases in return for a profit.  
                                                 
 * © 2017 Victoria Shannon Sahani.  Associate Professor of Law, Washington and 
Lee University School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B., Harvard University; 
coauthor of the book THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (forthcoming 
2017) (with Lisa Bench Nieuwveld); member of the Third-Party Funding Task Force 
(http://www.arbitration-icca.org/projects/Third_Party_Funding.html); member of the 
Advisory Council of the Alliance for Responsible Consumer Legal Funding (ARC Legal 
Funding) (http://arclegalfunding.org/).  The author would like to thank Catherine Rogers, 
Tony Sebok, Maya Steinitz, Jason Rantanen, Renee Jones, Nicola Sharpe, Shaun 
Shaughnessy, Margaret Hu, Brant Hellwig, Chris Drahozal, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Tai-
Heng Cheng, Jean Y. Xiao, Jamila Jefferson-Jones, Kristin Johnson, Laura Beny, Cary 
Martin, Audrey McFarlane, Twinette Johnson, Carliss Chatman, Cassandra Thomas Roberts, 
Stacy-Ann Elvy, Cometria Cooper, Douglas Sylvester, Jonathan Rose, Art Hinshaw, Tamara 
Herrera, Kaipo Matsumura, Andrew Carter, Sue Chesler, Troy Rule, Alyssa Dragnich, Bob 
Dauber, Adam Chodorow, Laura Napoli Coordes, Rhett Larson, Charles Calleros, Karen 
Bradshaw Schulz, Dennis Karjala, Betsy Grey, Bijal Shah, Erin Scharff, and Bob Miller.  
The author also expresses gratitude to the participants of the Inaugural Innovation, Business, 
& Law Colloquium (IBL Colloquium), hosted by the University of Iowa College of Law’s 
Innovation, Business, & Law Center; the participants of the Ninth and Tenth Annual Lutie 
Lytle Black Women Law Professors Writing Workshops; the participants of the New York 
University School of Law Center on Civil Justice Fall Conference on Litigation Funding; the 
participants of the American Society of International Law (ASIL) Research Forum; and the 
faculty of Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law for their 
invaluable comments on prior drafts.  The author is grateful to her exceptional research 
assistants Margaret (Molly) McGregor, Leanna Minix, and Margaret (Maggie) Hayes and for 
their assistance with this Article.  The author expresses her sincerest gratitude to Sheridan 
DuPont, Jennifer Leaphart, Andrew Cox, Rosalie Haug, Leslie LaCoste, Jordan Leon, and 
the student editing team at the Tulane Law Review for their superb editing work. 





406 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:405 
 
Attorney ethics regulations and other laws permit nonlawyers to become partial owners of law 
firms in the District of Columbia, England and Wales, Scotland, Australia, two provinces in 
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and other jurisdictions around the world.  
Recently, a U.S.-based third-party funder that is publicly traded in England started its own law 
firm in England.  In addition, some U.S. law firms are actively seeking advice (including from 
this Author) regarding partnering with third-party funders or starting their own internal third-
party funders to fund their own cases, both of which are controversial practices.  This Article 
analyzes the benefits and drawbacks of third-party funders becoming internal partners of U.S. 
law firms, rather than remaining as external investors.  To that end, this Article diagrams the 
existing structure of the third-party funding transaction and suggests new possible structures.  
This Article then explores how those new structures may affect procedure, evidentiary, and 
ethics rules and reshape both the third-party funding industry and the legal services industry.  
This Article concludes that careful, limited experimentation would reveal whether such a 
practice is a viable, desirable addition to the menu of third-party funding transactions or 
whether the existing third-party funding transaction paradigm remains the best option. 
Ultimately, this Article aims to start a conversation about rethinking the structure of third-party 
funding transactions. 
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 My partners . . . taught me that in order to create wealth, I needed 
to pair up with people whose strengths compensated for my 
weaknesses. 
—Kevin O’Leary, known as “Mr. Wonderful” 
on ABC’s Shark Tank television show1 
                                                 
 1. Jonathan Long, 10 Kevin O’Leary Quotes Every Entrepreneur Can Learn from, 
ENTREPRENEUR (June 29, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/247789 (quoting 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 There is a thin line between an investor and a partner.  The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines an investor as “one who invests 
money or makes an investment” and defines a partner as “a person 
who takes part with another or others in doing something, esp[ecially] 
either of a pair of people engaged together in the same activity, 
occupation, etc.; an associate, companion, or accomplice; a 
participant.”2  Unlike passive financial investors who only contribute 
money, active partners also contribute advice and ideas to help protect 
their own investments and promote the company’s overall success.3  
Third-party funders are entities that invest in litigation and arbitration 
for profit.4  Although third-party funders are currently passive 
financial investors, many of them would prefer to be active partners.5  
Like the “sharks” on ABC’s Shark Tank television show who invest in 
and partner with startup companies, third-party funders are looking to 
invest business savvy, advice, and mentorship into the law firms and 
parties with which they partner, not just money.6  For example, the 
                                                 
 2. Investor, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
99053?redirectedFrom=investor (last visited Jan. 23, 2017); Partner, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/138316?rskey=rPNvKl&result=1 (last visited 
Jan. 23, 2017). 
 3. See, e.g., Shelly Schwartz, Passive Investing Is Profitable, but There’s a Time To 
Get Active, CNBC: FA PLAYBOOK (Sept. 9, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/ 
2015/09/08/passive-investing-is-profitable-but-theres-a-time-to-get-active.html (noting that 
investors with a “hands-off” approach favor passive investment because active investment 
requires more risk, a “rigorous tool set,” and “unique investment processes”). 
 4. Some scholars use the term “third-party litigation funder” or “litigation funder” to 
refer to this type of investor.  This Article intentionally uses the term “third-party funder”—
without the word “litigation”—because this Article addresses entities that finance both 
litigation and arbitration, domestically and internationally. 
 5. See Radek Goral, The Law of Interest Versus the Interest of Law, or on Lending 
to Law Firms, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 253, 303 (2016). 
The issue of third-party capital involvement in the practice of law becomes 
increasingly important for the future of the legal profession.  And . . . there is more 
to it than meets the eye.  Law-firm financing is not limited to small-time personal-
injury attorneys, nor is it a pricier variant of commercial lending.  Compared to 
banks, third-party financiers take a more hands-on approach, and they often 
assume a position that far transcends that of a banker. 
Id.; see, e.g., infra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., Sarah Field, ‘Shark Tank’ Casting: Producer’s Advice for the Perfect 
Pitch, INQUISITR (June 22, 2014), http://www.inquisitr.com/1312752/shark-tank-casting-
producers-advice-for-the-perfect-pitch/.  
Getting past the casting hurdle is only the beginning of the journey for Shark Tank 
entrepreneurs.  If they do make a deal, there can be a long road ahead.  For many, 






408 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:405 
 
November 2015 press release from Bentham IMF, a U.S. third-party 
funder affiliated with IMF Australia and the world’s largest third-party 
funder, states: 
[W]e’ve established close relationships with a number of smaller, top-
tier [law] firms with whom we are partnering.  We view our portfolio 
approach as a way of providing strategic capital to elite litigation 
specialists.  We help them recruit talent, launch a promising new 
litigation specialty, or provide a safety net for their own risks, allowing 
them to pursue new cases.  In short, we help incubate [law] firms and 
practice groups. 
Importantly, we plan for the long term success of our partners . . . .  Of 
course, we’re not a bank, which is why we are extremely selective about 
choosing firms with strong winning records and with an eye on growth 
and innovation.7 
 Bentham IMF currently partners with those law firms as an 
external investor.8  Like the “sharks” of Shark Tank, however, it is 
likely that funders like Bentham IMF may soon begin to expect an 
equity stake in return for providing business savvy, advice, and 
mentorship to its clients.9  For example, in October 2016, U.S.-based 
third-party funder, Burford, which is publicly traded on a U.K. stock 
exchange, “has launched a new legal arm dedicated to helping clients 
enforce their arbitral awards” called “Burford Law.”10  Burford Law is 
licensed as an “alternative business structure” under the Legal 
Services Act 2007 in the United Kingdom.11  This law allows 
nonlawyer individuals and entities—like third-party funders—to have 
                                                                                                             
the Elephant’ creator Tiffany Krumins, who got a deal with [Barbara] Corcoran, 
has nothing but high praise for her investor: “She encourages me, inspires me and 
even puts me in my place when I need it.  Although she has many years of life and 
business experience she has always treated me with respect when giving guidance.” 
Id. 
 7. Bentham IMF Unveils New Portfolio Model for Litigation Funding, BENTHAM 
IMF (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.benthamimf.com/docs/default-source/default-document-
library/portfolioannouncementclean.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
 8. See What We Fund: Law Firm Financing, BENTHAM IMF, https://www.bentham 
imf.com/what-we-do/portfolio-funding (last visited Aug. 21, 2016) (“[Bentham funds] 
portfolios of cases for law firms on a non-recourse basis.”). 
 9. See, e.g., id. 
 10. See Lacey Yong, Burford Launches New Firm with Former Akin Gump 
Counsel, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Oct. 5, 2016), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/ 
1069002/burford-launches-new-firm-with-former-akin-gump-counsel. 
 11. See ABS Rising: Burford Capital Launches Its Own Law Firm with Akin Gump 
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partial ownership of law firms.12  Burford hired an attorney away from 
the law firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP to lead Burford 
Law.13  Burford Law “will handle English enforcement proceedings 
and act as a legal advisor to international counsel in enforcement 
proceedings where other jurisdictions are involved.”14  Chris Bogart, 
CEO of Burford, told Global Arbitration Review that “Burford has 
added the ability to be a law firm and to provide a more integrated 
service” and “that clients may retain Burford Law for advice on 
enforcement even if they are not receiving third-party funding or 
using the funder’s judgment enforcement services.”15  These new 
developments bring the quickly evolving third-party funding16 
industry one step closer to resembling a venture capital investment 
and blurring the line between law firms and third-party funders.17  The 
investments of third-party funders in both parties and law firms are 
highly controversial,18 yet they may prove to be crucial to supporting 
the tumultuous legal services industry, promoting access to the 
courthouse for indigent clients,19 and regulating the third-party 
litigation funding industry.20 
                                                 
 12. See Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 (Eng.).  See infra subpart IV.B.2, for more 
detail regarding the use of alternate business structures in the United Kingdom. 
 13. See Yong, supra note 10. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See supra note 4. 
 17. See generally Maya Steinitz, How Much Is that Lawsuit in the Window?  Pricing 
Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889 (2013) [hereinafter Steinitz, Pricing Legal Claims] 
(analogizing staged funding in venture capital to how third-party litigation funders should 
price legal claims). 
 18. Compare MAX VOLSKY, INVESTING IN JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
FINANCE, LAWSUIT ADVANCES AND LITIGATION FUNDING 25 (2013) (explaining the benefits 
of third-party funding for small businesses, law firms, and individuals with financial 
difficulties), with John Beisner, Jessica Miller & Gary Rubin, Selling Lawsuits, Buying 
Trouble: Third-Party Litigation Funding in the United States, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR 
LEGAL REFORM (Oct. 2009), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/ 
thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (discussing how third-party funding will destroy the dispute 
resolution system). 
 19. See, e.g., Paul Grossinger, Social Litigation To Produce Societal Change, 
TECH.CO (Apr. 29, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://tech.co/social-litigation-produce-societal-change-
2015-04. 
One New York crowdfunding startup, Justice Investor . . . , is melding the social 
media-crowdfunding strategy to revolutionize such litigation.  By seeding cases 
nation-wide through crowdsourced and foundation-based donations, the hope is to 
bombard local, state, and national courts with enough merited cases to force 
Congress, the Supreme Court, and State Legislatures to write in much stricter 
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 In the United States, partnerships between funders and parties to 
disputes in the form of joint venture entities and co-owned 
corporations are already legal and are becoming increasingly 
common.21  Funders serving as internal partners of law firms, 
however, would likely violate the attorney ethical prohibitions against 
nonlawyer ownership of law firms, fee splitting with nonlawyers, and 
the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers in most jurisdictions.22  
Nevertheless, law firms are looking for advice regarding partnering 
with third-party funders or starting their own internal third-party 
funders to fund their own cases—even this Author has been 
contacted.23 
 This Article explores the benefits and drawbacks of third-party 
funders becoming internal partners of law firms rather than remaining 
as external financiers as well as the question of whether the practice 
of third-party funders serving as internal partners of law firms may 
bend procedure, evidentiary, and ethics rules to an unacceptable 
breaking point or may instead reshape the third-party funding and 
                                                                                                             
 “JusticeInvestor.com is a B-Corp on the cutting edge of combining 
crowdfunding and social media to level the bench.  We convert slacktivists into 
investors in lawsuits who take a stake in the recovery if plaintiffs win.  Now with 
skin in the game, social media activism has a direct positive result on financing 
police brutality and social justice lawsuits—and can earni [sic] them both 
significant financial and social returns!” says Maxim Thorne . . . , CEO of 
JusticeInvestor. 
Id.; see, e.g., What We Fund: Public Interest, BENTHAM IMF, https://www.benthamimf. 
com/what-we-do/pro-bono-publico (last visited Aug. 21, 2016) (“Lawyers have traditionally 
provided pro bono services as part of their professional responsibility to offer wider access to 
the legal system, especially the discriminated, the poor and marginalized in our society.  
Bentham and IMF Bentham Limited are committed to this ideal, by contributing funds and 
time to pro bono projects.  In addition, we encourage our employees to support organizations 
that provide legal services to persons of limited means.”). 
 20. See generally Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding 
Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (2015) [hereinafter Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation] 
(proposing a regulatory framework for third-party funding). 
 21. See, e.g., Maya Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1155, 1160-62 (2015) [hereinafter Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims] (detailing three 
examples of funder-client partnerships through joint ventures). 
 22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (prohibiting 
nonlawyer ownership of law firms and fee splitting with nonlawyers); id. r. 5.5 (prohibiting 
the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers). 
 23. Due to confidentiality agreements in place, this Author unfortunately cannot be 
more specific with respect to these inquiries.  However, one law firm interested in starting its 
own funder to fund its own cases did mention to this Author that, if the cases were 
unsuccessful, at least the law firm would have a lucrative funding business.  This may prove 
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legal services industries in beneficial ways.24  The proposals in this 
Article regarding funders serving as internal partners are not meant to 
replace the traditional third-party funding transaction in which the 
funder remains an external, separate financier.25  These proposals 
would merely expand the menu of available transaction structures. 
 To illustrate the benefits and drawbacks of funders serving as 
internal partners, this Article presents diagrams of the third-party 
funding transaction.26  Diagramming the third-party funding 
transaction is important because the third-party funder has become a 
participant in dispute resolution without a clearly defined role.27  
Diagramming the transaction is a way to clarify the funder’s role and 
thereby determine how to regulate that role.28 
 State regulators believe that they know what role the funder is 
playing, such as a lender or an insurer, and the regulators appear to 
believe that the funder is playing the same role in every funding 
instance.29  When states have tried to regulate third-party funding, they 
have generally implemented one-size-fits-all regulations for the 
funding industry through statutes or case law, such as taking a 
preexisting statutory cap on traditional loan interest rates (i.e., usury 
laws) and applying that exact same cap to third-party funding rates of 
return.30  However, the funder actually may be playing different roles 
                                                 
 24. See supra note 23; see also discussion infra Part III (exploring how to restructure 
the traditional model of third-party lending). 
 25. See infra Diagrams A & B; see also discussion infra Part II (explaining the 
features and risks of the traditional triangular third-party funding transaction). 
 26. See infra Diagrams A, B, C, & D. 
 27. See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 
388, 399-402 (2016) [hereinafter Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding] (listing the existing 
roles in dispute resolution into which a third-party funder does not fit). 
 28. See discussion infra Part IV (explaining how to alter the traditional 
conceptualization of third-party funding to allow the funder to have a role as part of the firm, 
client, or some other capacity). 
 29. See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 9-A, § 12 (2016); Nonrecourse Civil Litigation Act, NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 25-3301 to 3309 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (LexisNexis 2016). 
 30. See sources cited supra note 29; Ben Hallman & Caitlin Ginley, States Are 
Battleground in Drive To Regulate Lawsuit Funding, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 2, 
2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/02/02/2160/states-are-battleground-drive-regulate- 
lawsuit-funding; Amanda Robert, New Jersey Lawmakers Introduce State’s First Lawsuit 
Lending Bill, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Dec. 30, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/ 
510628314-new-jersey-lawmakers-introduce-state-rsquo-s-first-lawsuit-lending-bill.  The 
vast majority of states that regulate third-party funding do not characterize third-party 
funding as a loan, but Colorado provides a notable exception.  See Oasis Legal Fin. Grp., 
LLC v. Coffman, 361 P.3d 400, 406, 410 (Colo. 2015) (categorizing third-party funding as a 
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or multiple roles, depending on the circumstances of the case, the 
client’s needs, and the structure of the transaction.31  In essence, the 
funder redefines its role on a case-by-case basis through its 
customized funding arrangements with each client.32  Thus third-party 
funding may need more than one regulatory regime: a different 
regulatory regime to cover each of the funding transaction structures 
in which the funder plays a different role.33  This approach is superior 
to one-size-fits-all regulations that may be overinclusive, 
underinclusive, or ineffective because each regulatory regime would 
be tailored to target the unique way in which each type of third-party 
funding transaction actually operates in practice.34  To facilitate the 
development of specific regulatory frameworks tailored to 
transactional structures, this Article begins by diagramming the 
various roles of the funder in relation to the attorney and client.35 
 In addition, there are preexisting regulatory regimes that may 
apply to third-party funders if those funders are incorporated into 
existing roles through new transaction structures.36  To the extent that 
those transactional structures resemble existing regulated transaction 
types or the funder’s role resembles existing regulated roles (e.g., 
party, attorney, etc.), then that particular transaction structure for 
third-party funding can be regulated under the corresponding 
preexisting regulatory scheme.37  To the extent that the funder is 
                                                                                                             
and against categorizing third-party funding as a loan, see Shannon, Harmonizing 
Regulation, supra note 20, at 892-96. 
 31. See discussion infra Part IV (presenting two examples of additional roles that the 
funder could play). 
 32. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Informational Report to the House of 
Delegates, ABA 8 (Feb. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.auth
checkdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA White Paper]. 
 33. See discussion infra Part IV (explaining how to alter the traditional 
conceptualization of third-party funding to allow the funder to have a role as part of the firm, 
client, or some other capacity). 
 34. Cf. Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 409, 445 (discussing 
how a single regulatory definition of third-party funding would be inherently overinclusive, 
underinclusive, or both). 
 35. Cf. LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3–11 (2012) (explaining and diagramming the various 
possible relationships between the funder, client, and attorney, including the triangular 
relationship discussed in this Article). 
 36. See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 397-98. 
 37. See discussion infra subpart IV.A (examining the currently allowed and 
increasingly employed structure of a funder serving as a co-venturer along with the original 
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creating a new transaction type or a new role in the transaction, then 
creating new regulations would be appropriate.38 
 It is important to note, however, that the structures mentioned in 
this Article do not contemplate every possible third-party funding 
transaction.39  For example, some funding transactions not addressed 
by the new structures explored in this Article include a full 
assignment of the entire claim to the funder, the funder retaining its 
own separate legal counsel, an insurance company indemnifying 
either the legal expenses or the underlying liability (or both),40 or the 
existence of external creditors who may have a claim to amounts 
recovered by the winning client.41  Still, at its core, every funding 
transaction starts with three entities—a client, an attorney, and a 
funder—so the tripartite structures presented in this Article provide a 
good foundation upon which additional complexity can be built.42 
 This Article builds on prior scholarly work that proposes a 
framework for regulating third-party funding in three categories: the 
procedural, transactional, and ethical categories.43  This proposed 
                                                 
 38. See discussion infra subpart IV.B (exploring how to allow funders to have an 
ownership stake in law firms by revising Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4).  For 
example, this structure is already allowed in the District of Columbia and in the United 
Kingdom pursuant to the Legal Services Act of 2007.  See infra notes 159-160. 
 39. For simplicity, this Article models the funding transaction structure for a single 
plaintiff bringing a single claim against a single defendant.  There are many other lawsuit 
structures possible, which may then require different structures for the funding transaction.  
For example, the structures in this Article do not directly address third-party funding 
arrangements involving outright assignments, multiparty lawsuits, or lawsuits involving 
cross-claims or counterclaims.  In addition, this Article does not directly address defense-side 
funding, which requires a different third-party funding transaction structure than claim-side 
funding. 
 40. Cf. Charles Silver, Litigation Funding Versus Liability Insurance: What’s the 
Difference?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 618 (2014). 
By purchasing insurance, a potential defendant trades a fixed loss in the present for 
a carrier’s willingness to bear an uncertain loss in the future.  Third-party litigation 
funding is the mirror image of this arrangement.  A plaintiff accepts a fixed gain 
today in return for giving a funder a share of a gamble that may or may not pay off.  
The claim that liability insurance should be permitted while third-party funding is 
barred boils down to the assertion that it should be lawful to trade in potential 
litigation-related losses but not in potential litigation-related gains.  I do not see 
how this proposition can be maintained. 
Id. 
 41. See supra note 39. 
 42. See infra Diagram A. 
 43. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 868, 911-12 (proposing 
a regulatory framework for procedural, transactional, and ethical regulations).  See generally 
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framework would implement key regulations within each of those 
three categories and would link those regulations together through 
cross-references to create a harmonized regulatory framework.44  This 
Article focuses on the transactional regulations and suggests new 
structures for the third-party funding transaction to mitigate the risks 
involved, bring down the cost of capital,45 and increase access to third-
party funding for both consumer and commercial clients.46  This 
Article also addresses some of the related attorney ethical regulations 
embodied in the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.47 
 The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part II of this 
Article explains the existing structure of the third-party funding 
transaction and details the inherent risks in that structure, such as the 
dispute resolution system’s uncertainties, human behavioral risks, and 
the risks of inadequate regulatory compliance.  Part III of this Article 
explores whether changing the structure of the third-party funding 
transaction would somewhat mitigate those risks, thereby reducing the 
price of third-party funding and increasing access to capital for more 
parties.  To that end, Part IV explores radical new “T”-shaped 
structures for the third-party funding transaction in which the funder 
enters into a joint venture with either the client or the law firm.  
Funder-client joint ventures currently exist, but this Article proposes 
and explores funder-law firm joint ventures for the first time in 
academic literature.  These two new structures fundamentally change 
the third-party funder’s role from an external funding source to an 
internal partner of either the client or the law firm.  Part IV also 
explores the benefits and drawbacks of these two new structures and 
whether these two new structures would mitigate many of the inherent 
risks in the third-party funding transaction described in Part II.  Part V 
concludes. 
                                                                                                             
within the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, evidentiary privileges, and rules 
of international arbitration procedure). 
 44. See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 408-10, 429-31, 445 
(discussing the need for a unified regulatory definition for “third-party funding” and “third-
party funder”); Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 868, 911-12 (cross-
referencing the regulations among the three categories of regulations: procedural, 
transactional, and ethical). 
 45. See, e.g., MIGHTY, https://mighty.com/mission (last visited Aug. 22, 2016) 
(explaining how legal funding gives plaintiffs a financial advantage over defendants). 
 46. See discussion infra Parts II, III, & IV (describing those risks and presenting new 
transactional structures to mitigate those risks). 
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II. THE PROBLEM: THE RISKY TRIANGULAR THIRD-PARTY 
FUNDING TRANSACTION 
A. Diagraming the Triangular Transaction 
 This Article addresses structural aspects of the third-party 
funding transaction by diagraming the funder’s relationship to the 
legal representation.48  Normally, the funder, client, and attorney 
remain three separate entities involved in the funding transaction 
leading to some variation of the following triangular diagrams.49 
 These traditional triangular depictions of the third-party 
funding relationship assume that the funder is a separate entity from 
the client and attorney.50  This Part explains why the traditional 
depiction of the third-party funding relationship is triangular.  Part IV 
of this Article then explores the possibility of making the funder part 
of the client—which is currently allowed and is increasingly 
common—or making the funder part of the law firm—which is 
currently prohibited under attorney Rules of Professional Conduct.51  
In other words, this Article explores structures in which the funder 
does not remain separate but rather combines with the client as a 
coventurer or combines with the attorney as a coadvisor.52 
 Presently, there are at least four common structures involving a 
third-party funder, which is a financier entity that could be a bank, 
                                                 
 48. See discussion supra Part I. 
 49. If the funder takes a full assignment of the claim, then the funder becomes the 
party to the case, and only the funder and the attorney would be involved in the actual case.  
For an in-depth discussion of assignment and insurance policies in the third-party litigation 
funding context, see sources cited infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 50. See supra Diagrams A & B and accompanying text; discussion infra notes 64-70 
and accompanying text (noting that the triangular framework requires three separate entities). 
 51. See infra Part IV, for a discussion of both structures. 
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hedge fund, insurance company, or some other entity or individual.53  
First, the quintessential third-party funding arrangement usually has 
the following three characteristics: “(1) the funder contracts directly 
with the original party to the case (i.e., not with the client’s attorney); 
(2) the original party remains a party to the case; and (3) the funder 
does not become a party in the case (i.e., not an assignment of the 
underlying claim or liability).”54  In this paradigmatic arrangement, if 
the funded client is a plaintiff, the funder usually contracts to receive a 
percentage or fraction of the proceeds from the case if the plaintiff 
wins.55  Unlike a loan, the funded plaintiff does not have to repay the 
funder if it loses the case or does not recover any money.56  “If the 
funded [client] is the defendant, then the [funder] contracts to receive 
a predetermined . . . payment from the defendant, similar to an 
insurance premium,” and the agreement may include an extra 
payment to the funder if the defendant wins the case.57 
 Second, if the structure is instead an assignment of a claim, then 
the original client sells the entire claim and walks away leaving the 
funder to pursue the claim as a party.58  Thus the funder may become a 
party to the dispute through assignment.59  Depending on the structure 
of the funding arrangement, the funder may legally control or 
                                                 
 53. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 4-13, 19-34 (describing the 
various types of third-party funding arrangements); Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra 
note 20, at 863 n.3 (same). 
 54. Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 863 n.3 (describing the 
quintessential funding arrangement). 
 55. See id. at 863. 
 56. See id. at 892. 
 57. Id. at 863, 894. 
 58. For an in-depth discussion of assignment and insurance policies in the third-party 
litigation funding context, see Terrence Cain, Third Party Funding of Personal Injury Tort 
Claims: Keep the Baby and Change the Bathwater, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 11, 19 (2014); 
Anthony J. Sebok, Betting on Tort Suits After the Event: From Champerty to Insurance, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 462-71 (2011); Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort 
Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 329-30 (1987); Silver, supra note 40; Paul Bond, Comment, 
Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1297-98 
(2002).  It is important to note, however, that third-party funders cannot buy a claim in 
investment treaty arbitration and pursue it separately from the original claimant due to 
jurisdictional requirements in the treaty regarding the nationality of the investor-claimant and 
the claimant’s specific investment in the territory of the host state.  See generally Christoph 
Schreuer, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1 MCGILL J. 
DISP. RESOL. 1 (2014) (explaining that the claimant’s nationality is a requisite for jurisdiction 
under treaties and that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine whether nationality 
requisites under domestic law are fulfilled). 
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influence aspects of the legal representation or may completely take 
over the case and step into the shoes of the original party.60 
 Third, if the structure is a liability insurance arrangement that 
also funds legal expenses, then the insurer-funder may remain a 
nonparty or may be impleaded as a third-party defendant under Rule 
14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or an analogous state rule 
of procedure.61 
 Fourth, funders may finance law firms instead of individual 
parties.62  The funder may finance a single case or all or part of a law 
firm’s portfolio of cases.63  Law firm funding is often structured like a 
loan secured by the law firm’s accounts receivable or expected 
contingent fees.64 
                                                 
 60. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 8 (explaining that some third-
party funding arrangements are structured as an assignment in which the third-party funder 
becomes the claimant in the case and the original party is no longer involved); see also 
sources cited supra note 58 (discussing assignment and insurance policies in the third-party 
litigation funding context). 
 61. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 863 n.3; sources cited 
supra note 58.  Also, for an in-depth discussion of insurance that specifically covers legal 
expenses, see NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35 (discussing the use of third-party 
funding in the forms of after-the-event insurance, before-the-event insurance, and insurance 
for legal expenses in various jurisdictions around the world). 
 62. For an examination of lawyer lending, see Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer 
Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (2014) [hereinafter Engstrom, 
Lawyer Lending] (discussing the consequences and structures of alternative legal financing 
to lawyers); Nora Freeman Engstrom, Re-Re-Financing Civil Litigation: How Lawyer 
Lending Might Remake the American Litigation Landscape, Again, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 110 (2013) [hereinafter Engstrom, Re-Re-Financing] (discussing specific 
instances, and the increased frequency of, lawyers contributing capital to their cases). 
 63. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 3-13, 19-34 (describing the 
various types of third-party funding arrangements); Engstrom, Re-Re Financing, supra note 
62, at 116-18. 
 64. See generally Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation Financing: Another Subprime 
Industry that Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83, 87-88 (2008) 
(analogizing third-party lending to subprime lending in home mortgages); Maya Steinitz, 
Whose Claim Is This Anyway?  Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 
(2011) [hereinafter Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?] (defining third-party funding).  
A party may also engage both a contingency fee attorney and a third-party litigation funder to 
work together on its case.  See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 4-11 (describing 
the players in third-party funding, the types of funding relationships, and the effect of the 
type of funder on the attorney-client relationship); Engstrom, Lawyer Lending, supra note 62, 
at 397 (“Indeed, these loans have helped to finance some of the most important tort cases 
initiated over the past two decades . . . .”); Engstrom, Re-Re-Financing, supra note 62, at 118 
(discussing the rising trend in which personal injury attorneys rely on third-party funding to 
ease the burden of “using yesterday’s payday to fund tomorrow’s payout”); Goral, supra note 
5, at 261 (“Lawyers whose net worth is stranded in lawsuits go about their cash flow 
volatility and demand for capital in the same way that any other business would: they look 
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 Each of these four structures has its own benefits, drawbacks, 
and regulatory challenges.65  This Article focuses on the first and 
fourth structures, depicted in the triangular diagrams above, because 
those are the only two structures in which the original party remains a 
party to the case and the funder does not become a party in the case.  
Diagram A, above, depicts the first structure, and Diagram B, above, 
depicts the fourth structure.  Both the first and fourth structures are 
traditionally conceptualized as a triumvirate of funder, attorney, and 
client, as depicted in Diagrams A and B.66  It is important to note that 
under current law in many countries, the attorney, funder, and client 
are not normally all parties to any single agreement that makes up the 
funding transaction.67  Current law in the United States allows 
contractual lines to be drawn between only two of the three 
participants (funder, client, and attorney) at any given time.68  
                                                                                                             
Control?, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2939, 2943-48 (2014) (discussing the ethical implications of 
fee splitting and litigation investment in the context of loan repayment). 
 65. See W. Bradley Wendel, Alternative Litigation Finance and Anti-
Commodification Norms, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 655-56 (2014). 
A different anti-ALF argument relies on the effect of third-party financing on the 
attorney-client relationship.  We have also been down this road already in the 
context of the long debate among insurance law and professional responsibility 
scholars over the triangular relationship among insurer, insured, and defense 
counsel.  One might argue that if the law has managed the problem successfully in 
the area of insurance defense representation, there is no cause for alarm when a 
non-insurer third party provides the financing for legal representation. On the other 
hand, one might point to uncertainties that persist in the “eternal triangle” and be 
reluctant to open a similar can of worms in an area with relatively little existing law 
to stabilize the relationships among the parties.  Significantly, both of these 
versions of the anti-ALF argument concede that ALF is similar enough to existing 
economic relationships to be deemed prima facie acceptable; the only question is 
how best to regulate it to prevent abuse. 
Id.; see discussion infra Part IV (comparing the implications from each framework). 
 66. See generally NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35 (discussing the law of 
third-party funding in over thirty countries). 
 67. See id. at 3-13, 19-34 (describing the various types of third-party funding 
arrangements); Shannon, supra note 20, at 863 n.3 (same). 
 68. See, e.g., Matthew Bogdan, Note, The Decisionmaking Process of Funders, 
Attorneys, and Claimholders, 103 GEO. L. J. 197, 207 (2014). 
Establishing a relationship with a funder can create complications for the attorney 
when it comes to sharing fees, providing collateral for loans, dealing with removal 
of counsel, and protecting client confidences.  These prohibitions may make it 
legally impermissible to enter into an agreement in the first place, or may make it 
so that the attorney does not view the arrangement as feasible in light of the 
additional burdens. 
Id.  The implication here is that the funder can have an agreement with either the client or the 
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Diagrams abstracting the third-party funding arrangement often adopt 
a triangular shape in which the solid lines between each of the points 
on the triangle represent signed contracts between those participants 
in the funding transaction, even though all three points of the 
“triangle” may not be connected.69  This is why there is a combination 
of solid and dotted lines in Diagrams A and B.  Regardless of the 
structure of the transaction, however, the funder, attorney, and client 
may all interact with one another at least informally in order to work 
together toward their common goal of winning the case—hence the 
traditional triangular illustration.70 
 Diagram A depicts a quintessential third-party funding 
arrangement involving a single dispute (litigation or arbitration) in 
which the funder directly finances the party to the dispute.71  In 
Diagram A, the client-attorney and client-funder lines are solid, and 
the line between the attorney and the funder is dotted.72  The client-
attorney solid line represents the attorney retainer agreement, and the 
client-funder solid line represents the third-party funding contract.73  
The dotted line between the funder and attorney indicates that the two 
are working together at the inclination of their mutual client and that 
they are prevented from signing a separate contract defining their 
relationship with one another in light of the attorney’s professional 
and ethical obligations to the client.74   In some jurisdictions, a client’s 
funding agreement with the funder and its retainer agreement with its 
                                                                                                             
 The analysis of conflicts of interest here assumes that a client-lawyer 
relationship exists only between the lawyer and the client seeking the services of an 
ALF supplier.  If the lawyer also has a professional relationship with the ALF 
supplier, then a conventional concurrent conflict of interest arises, which must be 
analyzed under the principles of Model Rule 1.7.  A professional relationship with 
the supplier may arise by express contract or by implication from the conduct of 
the parties. . . .  In particular, [if] the lawyer had performed legal services for the 
supplier in the past, suggesting it was permissible to infer that the lawyer had 
intended to represent both the plaintiff and the supplier in the funding transaction. 
Id. 
 69. See supra Diagrams A & B. 
 70. See generally ABA White Paper, supra note 32 (discussing what lawyers must do 
to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct when a third-party funder is involved in a 
case). 
 71. See supra Diagrams A & B. 
 72. See supra Diagrams A & B. 
 73. See supra Diagrams A & B. 
 74. See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation 
Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 651-52, 659-64 (2005); Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This 
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attorney must be completely separate agreements.75  The retainer 
agreement is represented in Diagram A by the solid line connecting 
the client and attorney.76 
 In addition, the funder must be cautious with respect to 
potentially intruding on the attorney-client relationship and the 
attorney’s professional and ethical obligations to the client.77  For 
example, if there is a funder-client agreement regarding financing and 
a client-attorney retainer agreement in a particular case, then a funder-
attorney contract regarding the same case is prohibited due to 
constraints on attorneys under the Rules of Professional Conduct.78  In 
Diagram A, this prohibition is represented by the dotted line between 
the funder and the attorney, indicating that the funder and attorney 
may not have a contractual relationship although they may work 
together for the benefit of the client. 
 Diagram B depicts the situation in which a funder is funding a 
law firm rather than a party to a dispute.79  If there is a funder-attorney 
contract (i.e., lending directly to the law firm) and a client-attorney 
retainer agreement, then there will not be a funder-client agreement in 
the same transaction.80  This is represented in Diagram B by the dotted 
                                                 
 75. See, e.g., State Bar of Mich. Prof. Ethics Comm., Op. RI-321 (June 29, 2000) 
(striking down a three-way funding arrangement in which the attorney agreed to refer clients 
to the funder; the funder agreed to fund those clients solely if the client hired the same 
attorney, and the client would have to agree to limited liberty with respect to control of the 
litigation, termination of the attorney, and settlement of the claim); Maya Steinitz & Abigail 
C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA L. REV. 711, 749 (2014) (positing a 
model funding contract that distinguishes from the retainer agreement). 
 76. See supra Diagram A. 
 77. See Richmond, supra note 74, at 651-52, 659-64; Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This 
Anyway?, supra note 64, at 1324–25; Neil Rose, Something for Nothing?, RACONTEUR ON 
LEGAL EFFICIENCY, Mar. 25, 2010, at 8, 8-9.   
 78. See, e.g., State Bar of Mich. Prof. Ethics Comm., Op. RI-321 (June 29, 2000) 
(striking down a three-way funding arrangement in which the attorney agreed to refer clients 
to the funder; the funder agreed to fund those clients solely if the client hired the same 
attorney, and the client would have to agree to limited liberty with respect to control of the 
litigation, termination of the attorney, and settlement of the claim); see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (detailing prohibited actions based on 
concurrent conflict of interests involving current clients); id. r. 1.8 (detailing prohibited 
actions based on conflicts of interest involving financial transactions with clients, financial 
assistance to clients, and the lawyer taking a financial interest in the client’s case); cf. supra 
Diagrams A & B (diagraming the different possible relationships between the law firm, 
client, and funder when they remain separate entities). 
 79. See supra Diagram B; infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Engstrom, Lawyer Lending, supra note 62, at 403 (discussing the role of the 
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line between the funder and the client.81  The reason for this is that the 
funder is funding the law firm directly, and the law firm in turn 
represents its clients who pay their bills as indicated according to their 
individual retainer agreements with the law firm.  The client is not a 
party to the law firm’s funding arrangement with the funder.  
Conversely, in Diagram A, the client-funder agreement addresses how 
the law firm will be paid, even though the law firm is not a party to 
the agreement.  Therefore, the funder will typically structure the 
agreement to fund either the law firm involved in the case or the 
individual party to the case, but will not make funding agreements 
with both the client and the law firm at the same time regarding the 
same case.82 
 Just like in Diagram A, the attorney-client retainer agreement is 
represented in Diagram B by the solid line connecting the client and 
attorney.83  Since attorneys require a retainer agreement with a client 
in order to represent them, there would never be a case in which there 
is a funder-client agreement and funder-attorney agreement but no 
attorney-client retainer.84  Diagrams A and B therefore represent the 
full universe of options for funding arrangements in which the funder 
is a separate legal entity from both the client and the attorney.85 
B. The Risks of the Triangular Transaction 
 There are a multitude of risks in any financial transaction, and 
third-party funding is no exception.86  The financial risks of third-
                                                 
 81. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 863 n.3 (describing the 
quintessential funding arrangement).  See generally NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35 
(discussing the law of third-party funding in pvery thirty countries). 
 82. See supra Diagrams A & B. 
 83. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 863 n.3 (describing the 
quintessential funding arrangement).  See generally NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35 
(discussing the law of third-party funding in pvery thirty countries). 
 84. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“The 
scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client 
will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing . . . .  Any 
changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.”). 
 85. See supra Diagrams A & B. 
 86. See, e.g., Bogdan, supra note 68, at 209-25 (discussing the financial risks of the 
third-party funding transaction); Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, supra note 21, at 1197-
1204 (discussing various risks and problems created by third-party funding including control, 
conflicts of interest, information asymmetry, the attorney client privilege, pricing, 
transparency, commodification, and transaction costs, among others); Steinitz, Pricing Legal 
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party funding are well documented in the existing literature and are 
not the focus of this Article.87  This Article does not address the 
financial risks because changing the structure of the third-party 
funding transaction in the ways explored in this Article will not 
mitigate the financial risks directly.  In addition, the third-party 
funding industry exists because funders are uniquely positioned to 
handle financial risks that parties and law firms are less equipped to 
handle; this is precisely why parties and law firms seek the services of 
the third-party funder.88  In essence, the financial risks are not a 
problem that changing the structure of the third-party funding 
transaction can solve or even should solve. 
 Instead this Article focuses on the nonfinancial risks that affect 
third-party funding.89  First, third-party funding carries the risks 
inherent in the dispute resolution system’s rules, procedures, 
inefficiencies, inadequacies, and uncertainties that affect whether the 
client will win, the amount of the judgment, and the amount of the 
costs.90  Second, third-party funding carries risks that those involved in 
the case—parties, attorneys, witnesses, judges, arbitrators, and 
funders—will not behave as expected or as promised, either by 
making errors or by being deceptive.91  The timing, nature, and 
                                                                                                             
principles, financial theory, economic valuation, and accounting principles); see also 
discussion infra Part III (analyzing ways to mitigate the risks discussed in this Part). 
 87. See sources cited supra note 86. 
 88. See Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in Search of 
a Solution: The Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919, 922 
(2015). 
The financier’s need to ensure a safe return on investment without a direct method 
for compelling litigation settlement (or non-settlement) puts him in an 
economically vulnerable position.  Sophisticated financiers therefore include 
various ex ante and ex post devices in the third-party litigation financing 
agreement itself to mitigate this risk.  The financier’s choice of clients, and the 
collateral or conditions the financier may require, protect the financier from this 
risk in light of his fundamental and nearly irreconcilable alienation from the 
attorney/client relationship. 
Id.; cf. sources cited supra notes 35, 86.  See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers 
as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273 (2012) (discussing the financial 
risks of class action litigation and nonclass aggregate litigation and arguing that third-party 
litigation funders can bear the financial risk in order to remove pressure and conflicts of 
interests from class counsel). 
 89. See sources cited supra note 86. 
 90. See sources cited supra note 86. 
 91. See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 422-27 (discussing 
the existing corporate disclosure requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 and 
proposing adding a new Rule 7.2 to require disclosure of the identity of the third-party funder 
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severity of the error or deception may actually change the amount that 
the funder will pay for the legal costs or the calculation of the funder’s 
fee, based on the parameters included in the funding arrangement.92  
These risks underline the necessity of trust in any transaction or 
procedure, but even with trust, the risk of deception is ever-present.93  
Furthermore, third-party funding carries the risks of a confusing, 
inadequate, or nonexistent regulatory scheme in many jurisdictions, 
which makes compliance uncertain or difficult.94  This, in turn, 
increases the risks related to the dispute resolution system and human 
behavior, since those who have to work within the dispute resolution 
system and honor the agreement may be confused regarding how they 
may carry out their obligations under the law.95 
 The dispute resolution systemic risks, behavioral risks, and 
regulatory compliance risks are the reasons why the outcome of the 
case is uncertain, even if one side has stronger evidence, better 
lawyers, or more money to spend on the case.96  These risks affect the 
underlying clients, attorneys, and decision makers (judges and 
arbitrators) involved in the dispute, in addition to increasing the 
funder’s financial risks in the transaction.97  All of these risks 
contribute to the funder’s calculation of the price that a winning 
funded client must pay to the funder in the event that the dispute is 
resolved successfully.98  That price is the portion of the judgment, 
                                                                                                             
an unscrupulous client running away with money after winning a case and not paying 
funder); Steinitz, Pricing Legal Claims, supra note 17, at 1910-17 (discussing the behavioral 
risks inherent in litigation and in third-party funding); see also, e.g., Weaver, Bennett & 
Bland, P.A. v. Speedy Bucks, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 448 (W.D.N.C. 2001), subsequent 
determination, No. 1:00CV249 2007 WL 3028305 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 15, 2007) (awarding a 
law firm triple damages against a third-party funder that secretly undermined the law firm’s 
contingency fee arrangement, such that the attorney received no fee after the client won); 
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003) (examining a 
funded client who won a windfall judgment and then refused to repay the funder and instead 
challenged the funding agreement in court). 
 92. Cf. sources cited supra note 91. 
 93. See Martin, supra note 64, at 88-89 (discussing Rancman as an example of a firm 
hiking its recovery percentage for the money it advanced to the client injured in an 
automobile accident); sources cited supra note 91. 
 94. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 868. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See sources cited supra note 86. 
 97. See, e.g., Bogdan, supra note 68, at 202 (describing the financial risks that vary 
with each transaction for the funder, including rate of interest, size of investment, and the 
type of commercial litigation). 
 98. See id.  Successful resolution normally includes a judgment in favor of the 
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award, or settlement that the funded client must pay to the funder 
under their funding agreement.99  The larger the funder’s share, the 
higher the price.100  The remainder of this subpart examines these risks 
in greater detail. 
 With respect to the dispute resolution systemic risks, the 
quintessential risk in any litigation or arbitration matter is the risk of 
losing the case.101  No case has an outcome that can be predicted with 
absolute certainty before the case is even filed.102  Yet, in most 
instances, the funder makes the decision regarding whether to fund a 
case before that case is filed.103  Thus, the funder is taking on the risk 
of loss because the funder will not be paid if the case is lost.104  In 
situations in which a funded party has hired both a third-party funder 
and a contingency fee attorney, the attorney is also bearing some of 
the risk of loss as well because the attorney’s fee is still tied to whether 
                                                                                                             
awarded due to a judgment or settlement must be recoverable from the opposing side in order 
to trigger the repayment obligation to the funder.  Of course, a funded party to a case that 
loses the case on the merits and is awarded no money usually does not have to pay anything 
to the funder at all.  (The structure may be slightly different if the funder is funding a law 
firm, such that the law firm may have to pay something.)  Thus the risk of loss is fully on the 
funder, and the funder includes the risk of loss in the risk-based price as well.  However, this 
Author does not view “risk of loss” pricing as problematic because the structure in which the 
funder takes on the entire cost of the risk of losing the case on the merits (without agreeing to 
pay the underlying judgment) offers the greatest benefit to the underlying client.  Therefore, 
the structures presented in this Article do not attempt to mitigate the “risk of loss” portion of 
the risk-based pricing scheme. 
 99. See Bogdan, supra note 68, at 201-02 (discussing methods of loan repayment 
upon settlement). 
 100. See id. (explaining the degrees of risk and factors that affect recovery and 
funding). 
 101. This includes the reputational risks of losing the case, not just the financial risks. 
 102. Economic theory predicts that if the outcome of the case could be predicted with 
certainty (or even a high degree of certainty), it would be settled.  See Hal R. Varian, What 
Use Is Economic Theory?, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. INFO. 5 (Aug. 1989), http://people. 
ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/theory.pdf (discussing opportunity costs and benefit 
analysis).  Arguably, even a case that ends in a consent decree might have a 99% certainty 
regarding the outcome, but there would still be some uncertainty, however slight.  See John 
Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1129, 
1134-35 (2009) (weighing the benefits and costs of settlement considering risk assessment of 
the outcome of litigation). 
 103. It is important to note that funders also may fund pending cases or cases that have 
already been filed.  In addition, defense-side funders often have to make a decision regarding 
whether to fund the defendant after the case has been filed since the defendant may not even 
be aware of the dispute until the case is filed. 
 104. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 20 (discussing the funder taking 
an interest in the “proceeds” of the case, implying that the funder receives nothing if there are 
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the client prevails on the merits.105  If the funder is funding a law firm 
directly, the arrangement may be structured such that the law firm is 
passing on some of that risk to its underlying clients.106  That risk may 
be passed along to the underlying client in controversial ways, such as 
charging clients the interest on money the law firm receives from the 
third-party funder, either as part of the law firm’s overhead costs or as 
a direct interest payment, thereby reducing the client’s recovery 
amount from the awarded judgment.107  This is controversial because 
forcing clients to pay such interest could dramatically increase the 
cost of litigation for many plaintiffs, particularly those bringing tort 
claims as individuals or as a class.108 
 The funded party is also bearing the risk of loss on liability to 
the extent that the party would have to pay a judgment or award 
rendered on a counterclaim or set-off if it loses.109  The funded party 
bears the risk of loss on liability because third-party funders do not 
pay judgments or awards—one of the many ways in which third-party 
funders differ from liability insurance providers.110  A funded claimant 
who prevails on the merits but is unable to recover enough (or any) 
money from the losing defendant would likely not have to reimburse 
                                                 
 105. This is because the attorney may receive either less than its full fee or no fee if 
the client loses the case.  The court fees and evidentiary costs of the litigation are borne by 
the funder during the litigation.  This is an advantageous arrangement for an attorney 
working on contingency because the attorney ordinarily would bear all of the costs himself 
when working alone.  With the funder’s involvement, some of the cost-based risk is shifted 
from the contingency attorney to the funder. 
 106. See Engstrom, Lawyer Lending, supra note 62, at 380 (“This means that, if 
lawyers borrow funds and then deduct [from the client’s judgment] interest on those funds, 
they stand to significantly increase the litigation costs their clients incur.  It also means that to 
permit the deduction of interest is possibly to authorize a multi-billion-dollar annual 
reduction in tort plaintiffs’ recoveries.”). 
 107. Id.  This Article does not express an opinion on the propriety of charging clients 
this interest. 
 108. Id. at 379-80 (“For starters, whether to allow—or disallow—interest pass-
throughs will have a significant effect on the cost of tort litigation.  Studies suggest that 
plaintiffs’ out-of-pocket expenditures (excluding legal fees) average on the order of 3%-5% 
of plaintiffs’ gross compensation.  In a tort system that delivers to plaintiffs roughly $172 
billion in gross compensation each year, a conservative (though admittedly back-of-the-
envelope) estimate is that plaintiffs’ litigation expenditures equal $5 billion.  Increasing that 
sum, even marginally, would be nontrivial.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 109. See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 400, 414-16 
(explaining that funders do not pay a losing client’s judgment, whether on the defense side or 
on a counterclaim). 
 110. See id. at 400, 409, 413-16 (discussing why funders are not insurance that must 
be disclosed under Rule 26 partly because the funder will not pay the underlying judgment); 
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the funder in full (or at all) for the costs depending on the terms of the 
funding agreement.111  In such circumstances, the winning funded 
party would likely not receive the full amount (or any) of the 
judgment or award, which is also a cost absorbed by the party itself.112 
 With respect to the regulatory compliance risks, academic 
literature and state regulators have unsuccessfully attempted to solve 
the potential problems of third-party funding while working within 
the confines of the seemingly immutable triangular structure 
described above in subpart A.113  In addition, as earlier explained in 
this Article, the existing legislation is necessarily underinclusive by 
targeting only third-party funding transaction structures in which the 
funder operates as an independent entity.114  
 Examples of potential problems that third-party funding may 
cause that regulators have not thoroughly addressed or not addressed 
at all include: the possible waiver of the attorney-client privilege or 
the work product doctrine for documents and information disclosed to 
the funder by current or prospective funding clients;115 how much de 
                                                 
 111. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 899-900 (discussing 
assignment and insurance policies in the third-party litigation funding context). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. at 864-68, 877-83 (discussing why existing regulations are inadequate).  
See generally NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 144-59 (providing a 51-jurisdiction 
survey of existing state laws as of early 2012); Jean Xiao, Note, Heuristics, Biases, and 
Consumer Litigation Funding at the Bargaining Table, 68 VAND. L. REV. 261, 271-75 (2015) 
(analyzing the laws on litigation funding in Maine, Ohio, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Tennessee, 
and other states); Richard A. Blunk, Have the States Properly Addressed the Evils of 
Consumer Litigation Finance?, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT. (Jan. 20, 2014), http://litigation 
financecontract.com/have-the-states-properly-addressed-the-evils-of-consumer-litigation-
finance (describing the third-party funding statutes in Maine, Ohio, Nebraska, and 
Oklahoma); Heather Morton, Litigation or Lawsuit Funding Transactions 2014 Legislation, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-
services-and-commerce/litigation-or-lawsuit-funding-transactions-2014-legislation.aspx 
(listing proposed and passed legislation by state).  The states that have passed legislation 
either allowing or prohibiting third-party funding of consumer claims include Alabama, 
Arkansas, Colorado (via an opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court), Maine, Indiana, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Nebraska, New York (allowed for large commercial disputes), Tennessee, and 
Vermont.  The states that have proposed or pending legislation in this area include Arizona, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana (other bills proposed), Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, North 
Carolina, New Jersey, New York (additional regulation of terms in third-party funding 
contracts), Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee (modifying its third-party funding 
statute), and Texas.  Other states that do not have statutes may have case law or attorney 
ethics opinions addressing third-party funding. 
 114. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 872-73, 879, 900-01, 
909-10.  But recent legislation is moving in the right direction toward protecting privileges 
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jure or de facto control (if any) the funder is allowed to exercise over 
the underlying legal representation;116 whether the attorney is 
constrained from communication and coordination with the funder 
according to the applicable Rules of Professional Conduct for 
attorneys;117 whether attorneys may refer clients to funders and, if so, 
whether the attorney may receive a referral fee for doing so;118 giving 
guidance to attorneys and funders regarding how to handle conflicts 
of interest involving the attorney-funder and attorney-client 
relationships;119 determining whether third-party funding must be 
disclosed to the judge or arbitrator for the purpose of assessing 
potential conflicts of interest;120 determining the reasonableness of the 
attorney’s fees when a third-party funder is involved;121 whether the 
funder may influence the settlement negotiations, either expressly or 
indirectly;122 “whether the funder should be required to cover possible 
costs if the funded client loses (either by posting a bond in court or by 
paying security for costs in arbitration);”123 conflicts of interest that 
may arise when the client’s attorney negotiates the funding 
arrangement on the client’s behalf, including determining the 
attorney’s own share of the winning judgment;124 “uneven bargaining 
power between the client and funder during the negotiation of the 
funding transaction” (if the client is negotiating on its own behalf);125 
                                                                                                             
to waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine for communications 
between parties and funders in Indiana); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2255 (2016) (providing that 
“communication between a consumer’s attorney and the [funding] company shall not be 
discoverable” and providing an exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work 
product doctrine for communications with funders in Vermont); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-3306 
(2010) (providing an exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product 
doctrine for communications with funders in Nebraska); see also Steinitz & Field, supra note 
75, at 714 (describing recent movements to regulate litigation funding). 
 116. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 872, 880, 906-07. 
 117. See id. at 872-73, 906-07. 
 118. See id. at 873. 
 119. See id. at 873, 906-07. 
 120. See id. at 873, 879, 903; Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 
422-34.  Scholars in this field have argued that the funding contract should also be disclosed 
to “provide courts with a credible signal from the private market regarding the merits of the 
case[,] improve the accuracy of adjudication, [and] cause funders to charge lower interest 
rates in an effort to demonstrate to courts the strength of the plaintiff’s claim.”  Ronen 
Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third-Party Litigation Funding—A Signaling Model, 63 
DEPAUL L. REV. 233, 235 (2014). 
 121. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 873. 
 122. See id. at 873, 906. 
 123. Id. at 879-80. 
 124. See id. at 880, 888, 905-06. 
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and the possibility that courts and arbitrators may exercise jurisdiction 
over a nonparty funder directly or indirectly, even though funders do 
not have a defined role and have not signed the contract or arbitration 
agreement in dispute.126  The regulatory holes and shortfalls left open 
by the existing patchwork of inadequate regulations create uncertainty 
in many aspects of the third-party funding transaction because the 
participants in the transaction may be confused regarding how to 
comply with the law.127 
 Current regulatory efforts focus on attempting to patch the holes 
in the existing regulations or introduce regulations where there 
previously were none.128  This Article explores the benefits and 
drawbacks of a more radical regulatory alternative: changing the 
underlying relationships between the funder, client, and law firm, and 
thereby reshaping the third-party funding transaction.  This means 
changing the structure of the third-party funding transaction and the 
role of the funder.  If a new transaction structure solves at least some 
of the aforementioned problems without creating any additional 
problems, then that new structure would be superior to the triangular 
structure that currently exists. 
 As described above in Part II, the paradigmatic representations 
of the third-party funding transaction assume that the funder is an 
entity separate from the client and the law firm.129  Part IV of this 
Article examines two potential structural solutions in which the 
funder becomes an internal part of the client or law firm and explores 
the benefits and drawbacks of those two possible structures.  Part IV 
also analyzes whether these two potential structural solutions could 
address many of these regulatory problems and decrease uncertainty 
in the transaction without creating worse problems than those that 
already exist. 
                                                 
 126. Id. at 879, 897-98. 
 127. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 877-83. 
 128. See Martin, supra note 64, at 87-95 (explaining the effects of current state 
restrictions on third-party lending, including those on usury and champerty); Bogdan, supra 
note 68, at 203-04 (describing the “artificial barriers” that stand in the way of effective 
decisionmaking between parties in third-party litigation funding); Morton, supra note 113. 
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III. THE SOLUTION: MITIGATING RISKS BY RESHAPING THIRD-
PARTY FUNDING 
 The realization that the existing structure of the third-party 
funding transaction is problematic and risky challenges us to consider 
other compelling and useful transactional structures for further 
legislative and academic inquiry.130  This Part first explains how 
funders currently mitigate these risks for themselves under existing 
structures and through their pricing mechanisms.  It then explains how 
changing the structure might help mitigate these risks for the client 
and attorney as well as for the funder.  In order for other transaction 
structures to be possible, however, the funder has to change its role 
from being an external investor to something else.131  This Part 
introduces the ways in which the funder’s role can shift and the new 
transaction structures that those shifts can create.  Part IV then 
examines one existing alternative structure and one new transaction 
structure and hypothesizes whether those structures may be better 
suited to addressing at least some of the potential problems described 
in Parts I and II. 
 The risks inherent in the financial aspects of the third-party 
funding transaction and the systemic risks discussed in Part II also 
inflate the price of third-party funding capital.132  From the funded 
party’s perspective, the price of third-party funding capital can be 
defined as the dollar amount, percentage, or proportion that the 
funded party who won or settled the case has to pay to the third-party 
funder out of the proceeds of its judgment or award.133  How does the 
uncertainty inflate this price?  Third-party funders determine whether 
to finance a case based on the characteristics of the dispute, such as 
the amount claimed, the weight of the evidence, the likelihood and 
                                                 
 130. Cf. Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20 (describing the various 
types of third-party funding arrangements and proposing a regulatory framework). 
 131. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 132. See sources cited supra note 86. 
 133. Essentially, the winning client is “paying” the funder for its services out of the 
proceeds from the judgment or arbitral award.  After subtracting the funder’s reimbursement 
for its costs, the additional fee that the client pays the funder from the proceeds of the 
successful case is the “price” that the client pays for having received the benefit of the 
funder’s financial contribution during the case.  This “price” is set by the funder based on the 
parameters of the case and the funder’s calculation, which may be by an algorithm or formula 
involving a variety of inputs.  See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 26-33 (detailing 
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difficulty of recovering money from the losing side, and the 
reputation of the party’s attorney.134  The funder’s determination of 
what proportion or percentage of the judgment or award to take is 
largely based on the funder’s calculation of the aggregate risk involved 
in the case.135 
 When combined with the risks inherent in any financial 
transaction, the risks described in Part II would make one wonder why 
third-party funders choose to make this kind of precarious 
investment.136  The reason that the funder is willing to make this 
investment is that, unlike the client and attorney, the funder’s business 
model is to mitigate certain risks to make the venture profitable.137  
For example, in the aggregate, the funder can mitigate the financial 
risks, dispute resolution risks, and behavioral risks by diversifying its 
portfolio and investing in multiple disputes at once.138  The funder can 
mitigate these risks by creating a portfolio of cases such that a certain 
percentage of those cases are likely to be winners, which will generate 
a certain rate of return for the funder.139  However, every one of the 
individual disputes in the funder’s portfolio will still carry many of the 
risks described above, especially the regulatory, behavioral, and 
dispute resolution systemic risks.140  By diversifying, the funder only 
                                                 
 134. See discussion and source cited supra note 133. 
 135. See discussion and source cited supra note 133. 
 136. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 28-32 (discussing how the funder 
ensures a rate of return over a period of years using a portfolio of cases). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id.; cf. David S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First 
Empirical Look at Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075, 1077 (2013). 
 Risk-averse individuals or firms will also eschew pursuit of positive 
expected-value claims, but not necessarily due to cost considerations.  The 
uncertainty inherent in legal proceedings will reduce the value relative to a risk-
neutral entity.  Thus, the transfer of a claim from a risk-averse to a risk-neutral 
party [i.e. a third-party funder] should yield an increase in total claims pursued.  
The transferred claims would be riskier and be brought by more risk-averse 
entities. 
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).  It is also worth noting that attorneys working on contingency 
can also mitigate risks by assembling a diverse portfolio of cases as well.  However, law 
firms do not have the additional cash flow that external investors provide to third-party 
funders.  Thus when client loses the case, the detriment to the contingent fee attorney is likely 
higher than the detriment to the funder. 
 139. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 28-32 (discussing how the funder 
ensures a rate of return over a period of years using a portfolio of cases); cf. Abrams & Chen, 
supra note 138, at 1077. 
 140. See supra Part II, for a discussion of the risks inherent in every piece of litigation 
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decreases the aggregate risk of its portfolio losing value; the funder 
does not decrease the internal risks inherent in an individual 
investment in an individual dispute.141 
 As a complementary strategy, reshaping the structure of the 
third-party funding transaction may reduce some of the risks 
inherently present within an individual dispute, not just a portfolio of 
disputes.142  Furthermore, reducing those risks would benefit not just 
the funder but also the client and the attorney, who are likewise 
affected by those risks.  Changing the structure of the third-party 
funding transaction may mitigate at least some of these risks and 
benefit the funder, client, and attorney in three important ways. 
 First, by changing the funder’s role to a coventurer (i.e., an 
internal partner of the funded party) or a coadvisor (i.e., an internal 
partner of the law firm), as set forth in Part IV of this Article, several 
of the risks discussed in Parts I and II would likely be reduced or 
eliminated.  These risks would likely be reduced or eliminated 
because the funder’s new role under each of the new transaction 
structures presented in Part IV would be categorized as a party, a 
party’s representative, or an agent of either the party or the party’s 
attorney under the existing rules relating to evidentiary privileges, 
conflicts of interest, and the attorney Rules of Professional Conduct.143  
Since the funder’s new roles would fall within the ambit of existing 
rules that govern the litigation system and the attorney-client 
relationship, then the risk of unsanctioned, lawless behavior by 
funders would be reduced.  Those existing rules provide for sanctions 
for named participants, and the funders would be included within the 
reach of those sanctions.144  The most effective sanction on a funder 
would likely be a monetary sanction or a public reprimand due to the 
funder’s need to maintain its reputation and constrain costs in order to 
remain a viable business enterprise.  The funder’s knowledge of the 
threat of sanctions would very likely cause funders to ensure that their 
behavior complies with the existing rules.  This would help reduce the 
risks discussed in Parts I and II. 
 Second, reducing or eliminating those risks would likely assert 
downward pressure on the price of third-party funding capital because 
“[f]unders are repeat players, and portfolio theory tells us that risk 
                                                 
 141. See sources cited supra note 86; discussion supra Part II. 
 142. See supra Part II, for a discussion of those risks. 
 143. See infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text. 
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equals reward for the funders.”145  In other words, a lower risk equals a 
lower reward, which, for the funder, would mean a lower price 
charged to the funded party who won or settled its case.146 
 Third, in the future, more affordable access to cheaper third-
party funding capital would likely give potential clients wider access 
to third-party funding and more bargaining power to keep a larger 
share of their winnings while still benefiting from third-party funding 
capital.147 
 Furthermore, reshaping the third-party funding transaction 
would likely help guide legislative choices by better defining the 
funder’s role and the legal relationships that the regulators should 
constrain or encourage.148  Regulators would benefit from having 
clearer definitions of the transaction types and relationships that they 
should seek to regulate, and restructuring the third-party funding 
transaction would allow regulators to create differently tailored 
regulations for each of the new structures of the third-party funding 
transaction detailed in Part IV.149  Moreover, attorneys would benefit 
from receiving clarity regarding the role of the funder in each 
particular transaction structure and whether the funder may legally 
exert direct influence or control over the conduct of the legal 
representations—for example, whether the funder is a coventurer or 
coadvisor and, if so, how much influence the funder may wield.150  
Attorneys would also benefit from having a clearer sense of the effect 
of the third-party funding relationship on their obligations to the client 
under the professional ethics rules.151  Additionally, judges and 
                                                 
 145. Bogdan, supra note 68, at 217. 
 146. See Bronsteen, supra note 102, at 1138 (“[P]laintiffs [are] risk-averse, preferring 
a certain settlement to the risk of a trial; [but] defendants [are] risk-seeking, preferring a 
possible payout after adjudication to a certain but smaller one in settlement.”); Jonathan T. 
Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 95-
96 (2010) [hereinafter Molot, A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem] (balancing factors 
of the costs and benefits of settlement). 
 147. See Molot, A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, supra note 146, at 72-73 
(examining the effects of risk aversion on bargaining power and noting the presence of “risk 
preferences that might otherwise threaten to overpower the merits in settlement 
negotiations”). 
 148. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 881-82. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See ABA White Paper, supra note 32, at 22-26, 39 (discussing the attorney’s 
existing obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct when third-party funding is 
involved in the case). 
 151. See generally id. (discussing the attorney’s existing obligations under the Rules 
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arbitrators would benefit from clearer regulations and clearer 
categories of transaction structures when trying to determine whether 
a third-party funding relationship exists when hearing a particular 
case or when trying to determine the propriety of a funding agreement 
in cases where the funding arrangement itself is in dispute.152  For the 
foregoing reasons, reshaping the third-party funding transaction 
structure—if appropriate—would likely reshape the future direction 
of the industry. 
 Keeping in mind the potential effects of mitigating the risks 
described in Parts I and II, the next Part presents the two proposed 
new transaction structures and examines the advantages and 
drawbacks of each. 
IV. RESHAPING PARTNERSHIPS: A TALE OF TWO “T”S 
 This Article fundamentally questions the notion that the funder 
will always remain as a separate entity and investigates two alternative 
transaction structures in which the funder becomes an internal partner 
of either the client or the law firm.  Each of these two alternative 
transaction structures can be represented by a “T” shape.153  Each of 
the two lines in the “T” would represent a contractual relationship.  
The horizontal line at the top of the “T” would represent an internal 
partnership between the third-party funder and either the client or the 
law firm.  The vertical line at the bottom of the “T” would represent a 
contract between that partnership (or joint venture) and the third 
participant. 
 There are two ways in which this T-shaped structure can be used.  
The first way is that the funder could create a joint venture corporate 
entity in partnership with the original client (the horizontal line).154  
The original client would then assign its entire legal claim to the joint 
venture corporate entity.  The attorney would then enter into a retainer 
agreement with the joint venture entity or funder-client co-owned 
corporation as its client (the vertical line).155  This structure would be 
                                                 
 152. Cf. Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27 (discussing how judges 
and arbitrators should handle third-party funding when they encounter it in the cases they 
hear). 
 153. See infra Diagrams C & D. 
 154. See infra Diagram C. 





434 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:405 
 
most appropriate for commercial third-party funding and might not be 
suitable for consumer third-party funding.156 
 The second way is that the funder could become an internal 
partner or co-owner of the law firm (the horizontal line).157  The joint 
funder-attorney team would then enter into a retainer agreement to 
provide combined legal and financial services to the original client 
(the vertical line).158  This structure is currently possible in the United 
Kingdom under existing law.159  By contrast, the only U.S. jurisdiction 
where this structure might perhaps be possible is the District of 
Columbia under Rule 5.4 of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, 
and the funder-attorney partnership would have to be very carefully 
                                                 
 156. See Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, supra note 21, at 1161-62. 
 Recognizing the full commodification of claims created by their 
incorporation and a liquid market in claims, I draw one major limit: I exclude from 
consideration the incorporation of noncommercial claims.  Commercial claims, 
more than all others, involve damages that can be remedied through monetary 
compensation.  When a claim’s natural remedy is monetary, commodification does 
not distort justice.  In all other instances, however, the drive toward 
commodification can distort justice.  While this Article will identify ways to 
ameliorate this dynamic through deal structure at bottom, injuries that call for 
nonmonetary remedies need to be sheltered from commodification.  Thus for the 
purposes of cleanly demarcating the incorporation of claims and its benefits, I 
exclude noncommercial claims. 
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
American litigation finance serves two different markets.  One is consumers 
bringing personal claims sounding, e.g., in torts, matrimonial, or workers’ 
compensation law, who need bridge financing while their attorney delivers a 
settlement or judgment.  The other is corporations, many repeat players, that want 
the money to pay the litigation’s expenses so they can free up the capital for 
operations, or that are faced with a claim too big for them to bring without 
financing.  The public policy concerns are quite different, in that consumers have 
less bargaining power and sophistication and therefore need more protection; 
personal claims are not always resolvable with cash alone, and the contracts 
involved are totally different.  While consumers can enter form contracts, 
commercial claims are always negotiated deals. 
Id. at 1161 n.11. 
 157. See infra Diagram D. 
 158. See infra Diagram D. 
 159. See Legal Services Act 2007, c. 29 (Eng.); Baker Tilly Int’l, Climate Change: 
Forecasting the Impact of the Legal Services Act—Litigation Funding, FULBROOK CAP. 
MGMT., LLC (Oct. 2010), http://www.fulbrookmanagement.com/climate-change-forecasting-
the-impact-of-the-legal-services-act-litigation-funding/.  This is also called the “Tesco law,” 
by those who argued that the “standard of advice would fall” and that buying legal services 
would be as easy as shopping at a supermarket like Tesco.  See Marion Dakers, ‘Tesco Law’ 
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structured to meet the requirements of this rule.160  All states in the 
United States would need to modify their adopted version of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 (or the equivalent rule 
in that jurisdiction) in order for this transaction structure to be 
possible.161  Coincidentally, there is a longstanding debate regarding 
the prohibitions listed in Rule 5.4 that dates back to the genesis of the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and is discussed further 
below in subpart B.162  This Part will now examine the benefits and 
drawbacks of each of the two T-shaped structures in turn. 
A. Funder as Party’s Coventurer 
 The funder participating as the underlying party’s coventurer is 
currently legally permissible and was first examined in the scholarly 
literature by Professor Maya Steinitz.163  In this structure, the funder 
and client become joint owners (coventurers) of a joint venture entity 
or corporation to which the client would assign the legal claim, and 
then the joint venture entity or corporation would become the party to 
                                                 
 160. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (D.C. BAR 2007). 
 161. See infra notes 337, 339-340 and accompanying text, for examples of literature 
explaining this debate. 
 162. See infra notes 283-291 and accompanying text (discussing the historical debate 
surrounding the prohibitions in Rule 5.4). 
 163. See Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, supra note 21, at 1158. 
This Article offers an alternative theoretical and regulatory paradigm: the 
“incorporation paradigm,” according to which litigation finance should be 
understood as a pocket of the finance industry rather than an extension of the 
contingency fee.  According to this new paradigm, commercial legal claims can 
and should be “incorporated” (as defined in Section A below) in order to minimize 
or even resolve the concerns that both proponents and opponents of litigation 
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the case and the client of the law firm.164  Professor Steinitz also 
identified some third-party funding transactions in which this 
structure has already been used.165   However, for this structure to be 
permissible, it is important to note that the original party must remain 
a co-owner of the joint venture and must not sell 100% of the claim to 
the third-party funder.166  If the joint venture were to bring the claim in 
court with the third-party funder as its sole owner, then this would be 
impermissible in many state jurisdictions and would likely violate the 
“real party in interest” rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.167  
                                                 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. at 1171-97 (discussing examples of this structure used in the real world). 
 166. See, e.g., BSC Assocs. v. Leidos, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 3d 319, 326, 329 (N.D.N.Y. 
2015). 
“[I]n order to fall within the statutory prohibition, the assignment must be made for 
the very purpose of bringing suit and this implies an exclusion of any other 
purpose. . . .” 
 . . . . 
 [A]n assignment of an action to “a shell formed exclusively for the purposes 
of litigating the instant action,” which did not purchase the debt instrument 
underlying the action, was champertous. . . .  “[I]t is champerty to sue . . . for debt 
that is not really your own.  [This] is litigation by proxy and prohibited by section 
489.”  In the present matter, Plaintiff’s representations have made clear that 
Plaintiff was formed as a shell corporation to permit the Matthews family to 
litigate this action.  The Court agrees with the Koro and Justinian courts that such a 
transaction falls squarely within Section 489’s prohibition on corporations 
speculating in lawsuits.  In light of Plaintiff’s assertions that it was created to 
enable the Matthews family to pursue the instant claims, and numerous contentions 
that it received this cause of action from BSC Partners absent any related 
obligations or assets, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s acquisition of this action 
violated the doctrine of champerty.  Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
complaint on the ground of champerty is granted. 
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Justinian Capital SPC ex rel. Blue Heron Segregated Portfolio 
v. WestLB AG, 981 N.Y.S.2d 302, 308 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)).  The only way this would be 
permissible is if the claim were transferred as part of a substantial sale of the assets of the 
original party, such as through corporate changes relating to merger, acquisition, 
restructuring, or insolvency. 
In [Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 270 N.E.2d 691 (N.Y. 
1971)], the New York Court of Appeals concluded that an assignment of a claim 
did not violate the doctrine of champerty where the assignment was “an incidental 
part of a substantial commercial transaction” in which the plaintiff acquired the 
assignor’s operating assets.  Key to the court’s analysis was the fact that the 
plaintiff’s primary purpose in effectuating the transaction was to acquire the 
assignor’s operating assets and not to bring an action on the assignment. 
Id. at 328 (citation omitted). 
 167. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 17 (“An action must be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party and interest.”); BSC ASSOCS., 91 F. Supp. 3d at 327-29 (denouncing the 
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This Article is the first to examine the benefits and drawbacks of this 
structure through the lens of a third-party funder serving as an internal 
partner of the client. 
 The first benefit of this structure is that no change in the existing 
law is required to allow this structure.  Additionally, this structure 
solves the issue of the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the 
work-product doctrine for information disclosed to the funder.168  This 
is because the funder would be classified as a co-owner of the entity 
that is the party to the case, so the preexisting common interest 
exception to waiver of evidentiary privileges would apply to 
information disclosed to the funder.169 
 Furthermore, this structure solves many of the issues that relate 
to the participation of the funder in the litigation or arbitration 
procedure.170  For example, this structure addresses the issue of how 
much de jure or de facto control the funder can exercise over the legal 
representation.171  The funder is functioning essentially as an internal 
                                                 
 168. See Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, supra note 21, at 1202-03 (“[P]rivilege 
issues for communications between [the funder and the plaintiff] would evaporate as they 
would be co-representatives of the SPV [single-purpose vehicle, i.e., the joint venture] client 
for all dealings with counsel.”). 
 169. See, e.g., J. Michael Martinez de Andino & M. Thomas Andersen, Common 
Interest Doctrine in the Fourth Circuit, VA. LAW., Feb. 2011, at 28, 28. 
The common interest doctrine is “an extension of the attorney-client privilege” or 
the work-product doctrine, and “applies when two or more parties consult or retain 
an attorney concerning a legal matter in which they share a common interest.” 
 Accordingly, the common interest doctrine requires an underlying 
privilege—either the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine.  “The 
common interest doctrine . . . is not a privilege in its own right.  Merely satisfying 
the requirements of the common interest doctrine without also satisfying the 
requirements of a discovery privilege do [sic] not protect documents from 
disclosure.” 
Id. (internal footnotes omitted) (first quoting United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1392 
(4th Cir. 1996); then quoting Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); then quoting Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 
F.3d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 2010)); see also Michele DeStefano, Claim Funders and Commercial 
Claim Holders: A Common Interest or a Common Problem?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 342-
52 (2014) (discussing the pros and cons of applying the common interest exception to waiver 
to funders). 
 170. See supra Part II, for a list of the issues that relate to the participation of the 
funder in litigation and arbitration procedure.  See generally Sahani, Judging Third-Party 
Funding, supra note 27 (proposing rule revisions and reinterpretations to address the 
participation of the funder in litigation and arbitration procedure). 
 171. See Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, supra note 21, at 1175 (“Each 
incorporation, whether loose or strict, is always coupled with a formal allocation of control 
and ownership of the claim, as well as a preemptive resolution of conflicts or a voting process 
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partner of the underlying client when it becomes a co-owner of the 
joint venture entity or corporation along with the underlying client.  
Thus the funder could exercise an amount of control commensurate 
with the allocation of ownership and control detailed in the joint 
venture agreement with the client.172  Such control may include 
directing the legal representation and making decisions regarding 
settlement.173  In addition, this structure solves the issue of technical 
conflicts of interest with respect to the attorney-client relationship.174  
The attorney’s client is a new corporation, rather than the original 
client or the funder, so the attorney should act in the best interests of 
the new corporation in consultation with both the funder and the 
original client.175  Moreover, this structure solves the question of who 
would pay security for costs, adverse costs awards, or “loser pays” 
costs.176  The joint venture would be liable to pay those costs, and the 
funder (and perhaps even the client) would contribute assets to the 
joint venture to cover those costs.177  Likewise, this structure may 
address the question of whether the identity of the funder must be 
disclosed to the judge.178  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 requires 
all corporate parties to disclose “any parent corporation and any 
publicly held corporation owning 10% or more of its stock.”179  Under 
                                                 
 172. See id.  However, unequal bargaining power of the funder and the client during 
the negotiation of the joint venture agreement is one of the drawbacks of this structure.  See 
infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
 173. See, e.g., Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, supra note 21, at 1189 (“The 
[funders] shall have the sole power and duty to direct and supervise all matters involving the 
Litigation (including trial strategies and planning and settlement strategy).”) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 174. See id. at 1191. 
 175. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 135-39. 
 176. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 26-27; Sahani, Judging Third-
Party Funding, supra note 27, at 400 n.55, 433-35, 439-40 (discussing whether the funder 
will pay security for costs or adverse cost orders if the funded client loses the case); Shannon, 
Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 872, 879-80, 891 (discussing whether the funder 
will pay security for costs or adverse cost orders if the funded client loses the case). 
 177. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) (discussing the award of costs other than attorney’s fees 
and the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party).  As the party to the case, the joint 
venture would be liable to pay the costs.  As owners of the joint venture, the funder and the 
client would be liable to fund the joint venture and thus, indirectly, pay the costs. 
 178. This structure alone does not solve the disclosure issue for arbitration.  A new 
arbitration procedural rule would be required to mandate disclosure of the identity of the 
funder.  See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 406-09, 427-31 
(discussing arbitration procedural rule to require disclosure of the funder’s identity and the 
International Bar Association [IBA] Guideline requiring a party to disclose identity of funder 
to arbitrator). 
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this Rule, a publicly held funder—such as Burford, Juridica, or IMF 
Australia—that owns 10% or more of the joint venture entity would 
have to be disclosed.180  Whether this rule applies to a privately held 
funder, however, would depend on whether that privately held funder 
is a “parent corporation” of the joint venture entity.181  Rule 7.1 (as 
well as its parent rule, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1) does 
not define “parent corporation.”182  There are several definitions of 
“parent corporation” that may be applicable.183  If the funder is a 
“parent corporation” under the appropriate definition, then it would 
have to be disclosed to the court, even if it is privately held.184  Finally, 
an arbitrator or judge could likely exercise jurisdiction over a nonparty 
funder by piercing the corporate veil of the joint venture, although this 
is rarely done in practice.185  In addition, a judge could directly 
sanction the joint venture as a party under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 11 or 37, thereby indirectly reaching the funder as a co-
owner of the joint venture.186 
                                                 
 180. See FAQ, BURFORD, http://www.burfordcapital.com/faqs/ (last visited Aug. 23, 
2016) (“Burford’s equity and debt securities are publicly traded on the London Stock 
Exchange.”); IMF BENTHAM, http://www.imf.com.au/about (last visited Aug. 23, 2016) 
(“IMF Bentham is a publicly listed company on the Australian Securities Exchange.”); Sara 
Randazzo, Litigation Funding Pioneer Hits a Road Block, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG, (Nov. 23, 
2015, 12:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/11/23/litigation-funding-pioneer-hits-a-
roadblock/ (describing Juridica as one of the three worldwide publicly listed litigation 
funders). 
 181. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1(a)(1) (requiring disclosure of any “parent corporation”). 
 182. See generally id. R. 7.1 (using the phrase “parent corporation” several times 
without defining it); FED. R. APP. P. 26.1 (same). 
 183. Compare Parent Company, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
p/parentcompany.asp (last visited Aug. 23, 2016) (“A parent company is a company that 
controls other, smaller businesses by owning an influential amount of voting stock or 
control.”), with 26 U.S.C. § 1563(c)(2)(1) (2012) (providing a more precise definition of 
“parent corporation” as a corporation that “owns . . . 50 percent or more of the total combined 
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or 50 percent or more of the total value of 
shares of all classes of stock in another corporation”). 
 184. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 903-04.  The vast 
majority of third-party funders are privately held.  Only three funders are publicly traded: 
IMF, Juridica, and Burford.  See sources cited supra note 180. 
 185. See, e.g., Yaraslau Kryvoi, Piercing the Corporate Veil in International 
Arbitration, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 169, 173 (2011). 
 186. See FED R. CIV. P. 11, 37; Piercing the Corporate Veil, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/piercing_the_corporate_veil (last visited Aug. 23, 2016). 
Definition.  A situation in which courts put aside limited liability and hold a 
corporation’s shareholders or directors personally liable for the corporation’s 
actions or debts.  Veil piercing is most common in close corporations.  While the 
law varies by state, generally courts have a strong presumption against piercing the 
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 Nevertheless, there are several drawbacks to this approach.  First, 
this structure is viable mainly for commercial parties seeking 
funding.187  Consumer third-party funding is considerably less likely to 
use this structure unless the costs and complexity involved in setting 
up a joint venture to own the legal claim are reasonable when 
compared to the amount of the potential recovery on the consumer 
claim.188  Even if the costs and complexity are reasonable, however, 
the lower bargaining power of a consumer claimant makes it more 
likely that the consumer claimant may be marginalized in the joint 
venture agreement.  This structure may therefore be undesirable for 
consumer funding, even if it is commercially viable for certain 
consumer claims. 
 Second, this approach is viable only for parties who are seeking 
commercial or financial remedies.189  This structure does not work for 
clients seeking noncommercial or nonfinancial remedies (e.g., 
injunctions or declaratory relief) because there will be no judgment 
from which the funder can collect a fee.190 
 A third drawback relates to disclosure of the funder’s identity to 
the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1.191  As discussed 
above, Rule 7.1 requires disclosure of publicly held corporations that 
are 10% or greater owners of the party to the case, but the vast 
majority of funders worldwide are privately held corporations.192  The 
                                                                                                             
of the corporate form (e.g. intermingling of personal and corporate assets) or 
undercapitalization at the time of incorporation. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 187. Cf. Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, supra note 21, at 1161 n.11 
(distinguishing consumer clients of funding and excluding them from the framework set forth 
for incorporating legal claims). 
 188. Cf. id. at 1174-75 (describing the “efficient and commonsensical” nature of loose 
and strict claim incorporation). 
 189. See id. at 1161-62 (“I draw one major limit: I exclude from consideration the 
incorporation of noncommercial claims.  Commercial claims, more than all others, involve 
damages that can be remedied through monetary compensation.  When a claim’s natural 
remedy is monetary, commodification does not distort justice.  In all other instances, 
however, the drive toward commodification can distort justice. . . .  [I]njuries that call for 
nonmonetary remedies need to be sheltered from commodification.  Thus for the purposes of 
cleanly demarcating the incorporation of claims and its benefits, I exclude noncommercial 
claims.”) (internal footnote omitted). 
 190. Cf. id. (excluding noncommercial claims from consideration). 
 191. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1. 
 192. See id.; Julie Triedman, Litigation Funder Juridica Pulls Back After Bad Bets, 
AM. LAW., Nov. 19, 2015, Lexis (noting that in 2015, there were only three publicly listed 
funding firms in the world); cf. sources cited supra note 180 (listing the only three publicly-
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joint venture’s corporate structure may be arranged in such a way to 
prevent a privately held funder from meeting the definition of a 
“parent corporation” under Rule 7.1.  In such a case, Rule 7.1 would 
not require disclosure of the identity of the privately held funder.193  
This Author has previously proposed adopting a new Rule 7.2 to 
require disclosure of the identity of the third-party funder in camera to 
the judge, which would solve this problem.194 
 A fourth drawback is that if the joint venture owns the legal 
claim, then it would be liable to pay a judgment, award, or setoff 
rendered on any successful counterclaims brought against it.195  The 
funder, as a co-owner, would be partly liable to pay the amount 
awarded on the merits, which conflicts with the funder’s normal role 
of only paying legal costs and attorney’s fees.196  A potential solution 
would be for the funder and client to stipulate in their joint venture 
agreement that the client alone will cover the amount of any judgment 
on a successful counterclaim against the joint venture.  Alternatively, 
they can stipulate that the client will reimburse the funder for any 
funds contributed by the funder to the joint venture that went toward 
paying a counterclaim judgment.  This will insulate the funder from 
the underlying liability while still enabling the joint venture structure 
for third-party funding arrangements.  If the client is judgment-proof 
or has no assets, however, then the funder may be liable for the 
judgment on the counterclaim if the judge pierces the corporate veil 
                                                 
 193. See FED. R. CIV. P. 7.1. 
 194. See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 424 (“[A] new Rule 
7.2 should be adopted to require that any party—whether a natural person, corporation, or 
otherwise—supported by a third-party funder must disclose the identity of its third-party 
funder to the judge only, in camera, for reasons discussed further . . . .”). 
 195. This would require the opposing party to have the ability to bring a counterclaim 
against the joint venture.  In order for the opposing side to bring a counterclaim against the 
joint venture, the original client would have to transfer its obligations (i.e., those obligations 
under the contract at issue on the merits) to the joint venture, not just the claim itself.  If the 
client does not transfer those obligations, then the opposing party could choose to bring a 
claim directly against the underlying client rather than a counterclaim against the joint 
venture.  Alternatively, the opposing party could counterclaim against the joint venture and 
join the original party as a defendant on the counterclaim.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2).  A 
third possibility is that the joint venture defending against the counterclaim could implead the 
original party on the theory that the original party “is or may be liable to it for all or part of 
the [counterclaim] against it.”  Id. R. 14.  This Author has not yet seen an example of this 
happening in the real world, so the foregoing analysis is purely theoretical. 
 196. See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 400, 414-15 (stating 
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of the joint venture.197  Thus this stipulation may not completely solve 
this issue. 
 A fifth drawback relates to the negotiation of the joint venture 
agreement and the attorney retainer agreement.  The client may not 
have enough bargaining power to negotiate favorably regarding the 
ownership structure of the joint venture, so the funder may take an 
overwhelming or controlling stake in the venture.198  If the funder 
takes a controlling stake in the joint venture, then the client may be 
able to invoke minority shareholder protections, depending on the 
contract provisions and the state law applicable to the joint venture 
agreement.199  In addition, this structure creates two layers of conflicts 
of interest in that the attorney may negotiate with the funder on behalf 
of the client in order to decide the terms of the joint venture and then 
the same attorney may negotiate with the same joint venture regarding 
its own retainer agreement.  A potential solution to both of these 
problems would be to require that the joint venture agreement be 
negotiated by a different attorney than the attorney who will 
ultimately represent the joint venture during the proceedings.  This is 
a best practice but currently not a requirement.200  The attorney 
negotiating the joint venture agreement should be paid solely by the 
original client, not by the third-party funder.  For example, the original 
client’s in-house attorney could negotiate the joint venture agreement 
or could hire an outside attorney to do so.  Since, as mentioned above, 
this type of T-shaped structure would be most suitable for commercial 
third-party funding arrangements, having the client’s in-house counsel 
                                                 
 197. See supra note 186. 
 198. Cf. Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, supra note 21, at 1161 n.11, 1175 
(“Each incorporation, whether loose or strict, is always coupled with a formal allocation of 
control and ownership of the claim, as well as a preemptive resolution of conflicts or a voting 
process by which such conflicts are resolved.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Kimble C. Cannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority 
Shareholder Rights Under Delaware Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants 
and Maximizing Long-Term Share Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 725; Stephen D. Bohrer, Protecting the Rights of Minority 
Shareholders in Privately-Owned Companies, INSIGHTS, Apr. 2007, at 1; Ben Jumonville, 
Minority Shareholders Receive Increased Protections Under New Louisiana Corporate Law, 
LA. L. REV. (Apr. 7, 2015), https://lawreview.law.lsu.edu/2015/04/07/minority-shareholders-
receive-increased-protections-under-new-louisiana-corporate-law/. 
 200. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see ABA 
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or outside counsel negotiate the joint venture is a reasonable 
requirement.201 
 A sixth drawback is that this structure does not solve the 
problem of what the attorney should do if the funder and the original 
client disagree regarding what the joint venture entity wants from the 
dispute resolution process.202  Since the funder has no true, merit-
based interest in the underlying dispute, having the funder serve as a 
co-owner of the joint venture can lead to a distortion of the litigation 
goals to the detriment of the original client.203  The solution to this 
problem proposed by Professor Steinitz is for the funder and client to 
negotiate and sign a litigation management agreement allocating 
control over the joint venture between the two of them.204  This is a 
reasonable approach that has been used successfully.205 
 It may appear to the reader that the drawbacks of this funding 
model outweigh the benefits, or vice versa.  Nevertheless, as 
mentioned earlier, this structure is legally permissible and is already 
being used.  Therefore, further academic and legislative inquiry 
should focus on mitigating the drawbacks and improving this 
structure.  If several of the foregoing drawbacks and limitations can be 
solved in the ways suggested in this subpart or in other beneficial 
ways, then the coventurer T-shaped structure may be superior to the 
original triangular structure for those clients and funders that can 
make use of it. 
                                                 
 201. See Steinitz, Incorporating Legal Claims, supra note 21, at 1161 n.11 
(distinguishing consumer clients of funding and excluding them from the framework set forth 
for incorporating legal claims). 
 202. See id. at 1175 (“Each incorporation, whether loose or strict, is always coupled 
with a formal allocation of control and ownership of the claim, as well as a preemptive 
resolution of conflicts or a voting process by which such conflicts are resolved.”). 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
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B. Funder as Law Firm’s Internal Partner 
 
 Funders currently can invest in multiple law firms as passive 
investors providing loans to the firms.206  In this T-shaped structure, 
however, the funder would join together with a single law firm and 
become an internal partner.207  This partnership could arise between 
existing funders and law firms, or a funder could create a new law 
firm, or a law firm could create a new funder.208  This T-shaped 
structure changes the relationship between the third-party funder and 
the law firm representing the party in the case, transforming the 
funder from an external financier to an internal partner of the law 
firm.209  Under this new structure, the law firm and funder together 
would provide legal and financial services to their joint client—the 
party in the case.210  That law firm would then contract with the client 
and offer the client a contingent fee arrangement.211  Most states have 
a cap, formula, or sliding scale that applies to attorney contingent 
fees, so the contingent fee arrangement with the law firm would be 
subject to those same restrictions.212  This is one example of how an 
                                                 
 206. See, e.g., supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.  See generally Engstrom, 
Lawyer Lending, supra note 62 (noting the increased frequency of funders providing loans to 
law firms and providing specific examples of such occurrences). 
 207. See supra Diagram D. 
 208. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (discussing third-party funder 
Burford’s creation of a law firm called “Burford Law”); supra note 23 (regarding law firms 
contacting this Author about potentially creating their own third-party funding entities). 
 209. Cf. discussion supra Part I (providing an in-depth treatment of lawyer lending). 
 210. Cf. discussion supra Part I (providing an in-depth treatment of lawyer lending). 
 211. The Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit the law firm from acquiring a 
proprietary interest in the cause of action, so the funding arrangement would have to be 
structured as a contingency fee if the funder is an internal partner of the law firm.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(i) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 212. See, e.g., George Coppolo, Medical Malpractice—Attorneys’ Fees, OLR RES. 
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existing regulatory provision could be applied to third-party funding 
as a result of this new transaction structure for funders who choose to 
become an internal partner of a law firm. 
 In addition, the funder would provide expertise to the client and 
the law firm regarding the financial aspects of the case, including 
claim valuation, cost estimation, and budget control.213  The funder 
already provides this expertise as a separate entity under the existing 
triangular structure described in Part II.214  In this way, the funder and 
the law firm would become coadvisors to the client.215  In addition, the 
funder would advise the law firm on practice management and 
financial matters, similar to a venture capital enterprise.216  The funder 
and law firm could split the fee as joint venturers or partners, 
depending on the organizational structure they decide to adopt for 
their partnership.217 
 This type of arrangement between the funder and the law firm is 
commonly known as a multidisciplinary practice or nonlawyer 
ownership of law firms.218  In the United States, both multidisciplinary 
practice and nonlawyer ownership of law firms are prohibited in all 
but one jurisdiction (i.e., the District of Columbia) and are highly 
controversial proposals.219  Accordingly, this T-shaped structure is 
                                                                                                             
(comparing the caps, sliding scales, formulas, and other restrictions on contingent fees in 
twenty-three states for medical malpractice and other types of actions). 
 213. See discussion supra Part II. 
 214. See discussion supra Part II. 
 215. See supra note 211. 
 216. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Steinitz, Pricing Legal 
Claims, supra note 17, at 1893 (“[Parties in third party funding] should deal with pricing in 
their contracts given the inherent difficulty in pricing legal claims. . . .  [A] practical solution 
lies with staged funding in a manner similar to the funding of start-ups by venture 
capitalists.”). 
 217. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 120 (explaining the connection 
between attorney contingency fees and third-party funding). 
 218. See Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note 64, at 1285 n.54, 1330 
n.215 (discussing multidisciplinary legal practice in the context of third-party funding); 
Victoria Shannon, The Funder as Co-Counsel: A Glimpse into the Future of Law Firm 
Ownership, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT. (Mar. 11, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract. 
com/the-funder-as-co-counsel-a-glimpse-into-the-future-of-law-firm-ownership/. 
 219. For a general discussion of both sides of this debate, see John S. Dzienkowski & 
Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market 
Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 85 (2000) (examining multidisciplinary practice); Michael W. 
Loudenslager, Cover Me: The Effects of Attorney-Accountant Multidisciplinary Practice 
on the Protections of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 54 (2001) 
(“With regard to the protection of attorney-client communications, the Commission 
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currently prohibited by the attorney professional ethics rules in the 
United States.220 
 In 2011, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 explored 
whether to allow “alternative business structures” (ABS) involving 
nonlawyer owners of law firms—including examining ABS regimes 
in the District of Columbia, England and Wales, Scotland, Australia, 
two provinces in Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
and other jurisdictions around the world.221  In addition, recently a 
U.S.-based third-party funder that is publicly traded in England started 
its own law firm in England.222  At the time of this writing, however, 
the ABA has chosen not to recommend changing the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to allow ABS.  If the U.S. rules were changed to 
legalize this structure, however, then it could perhaps transform the 
legal services industry.  This subpart analyzes the benefits and 
drawbacks of changing the rules to allow multidisciplinary practice or 
nonlawyer ownership of law firms viewed through the lens of third-
party funding. 
                                                                                                             
potential impairment of the attorney-client privilege.’”) (quoting ABA COMM’N ON 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 8 (2000)); Melissa 
Pender, Note, Multijurisdictional Practice and Alternative Legal Practice Structures: 
Learning from EU Liberalization to Implement Appropriate Legal Regulatory Reforms in the 
United States, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1575, 1600 (2014) (discussing the ABA Model Rules 
and their effects on regulation of multidisciplinary practices and nonlawyer ownership).  See 
also E. Patrick McDermott & Ruth Obar, “What’s Going On” in Mediation: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Influence of a Mediator’s Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary Benefit, 9 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 75, 85-87 (2004) (presenting an analysis of multidisciplinary practice 
in mediation); Alison Frankel, Lawyers Remain Deeply Skeptical of Non-Lawyers Investing 
in Law Firms, REUTERS: BLOG (May 9, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2016/ 
05/09/lawyers-remain-deeply-skeptical-of-non-lawyers-investing-in-law-firms/ (discussing 
objections to nonlawyer investment in the legal community); Jacob Gershman, Nonlawyer 
Ownership of Law Firms Is a Bad Idea, Say Bar Groups, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (May 12, 
2016, 11:41 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/05/12/nonlawyer-ownership-of-law-firms-
is-a-bad-idea-say-bar-groups/ (same). 
 220. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2016); see also 
Cindy Alberts Carson, Under New Mismanagement: The Problem of Non-Lawyer Equity 
Partnership in Law Firms, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 593, 593 (1994) (discussing Model Rule 
5.4 and its consequences in law firm ownership). 
 221. Cf. Memorandum from ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 Working Grp. on Alt. 
Bus. Structures to ABA Entities, Cts., Bar Ass’ns (state, local, specialty, & int’l), Law Schs., 
& Individuals (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
ethics_2020/abs_issues_paper.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA Memo]. 
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1. Expanding Access to Capital and Choices for Parties 
 There are several ways that parties can benefit from this 
structure.  One of the benefits of this structure is that authorizing 
funders and law firms to form multidisciplinary practices would allow 
clients to take advantage of the funder’s expertise as an advisor to the 
case.223  Currently, given the law firm’s professional responsibility 
obligations and prohibitions with respect to its clients, funders must 
remain distant from the attorney-client relationship.224  Although this 
may help protect the client from the funder’s undue influence, it also 
may prevent the client from receiving the full benefit of the funder’s 
expertise and advice regarding the economic aspects of litigation and 
settlement.225  In a multidisciplinary practice, the funder could increase 
the value added to the client by assisting the attorney and the client in 
making strategic decisions about the conduct of the case while also 
taking a more active role in protecting the firm’s investment in the 
case.  In addition, the funder’s advice could help increase the client’s 
personal knowledge of the economics of dispute resolution.226  
Allowing the funder to take a more active role and work with the law 
firm directly would encourage the funder to reduce the risks outlined 
above in Parts I and II at each stage of the case.  As mentioned in Part 
III, reducing those risks would likely decrease the cost of the third-
party funding capital.227  In a competitive market, some funders would 
likely be willing to offer their services cheaper than other funders.  
This could lead to stratification in the funding market, whereby the 
cheapest funders (i.e., those taking the smallest percentage of the 
judgment from the client) give no advice while the more expensive 
funders (i.e., those taking the largest percentage of the judgment from 
                                                 
 223. See sources cited supra note 218. 
 224. Cf. ABA White Paper, supra note 32, at 22-24 (discussing how attorneys should 
avoid third-party funders interfering with their independent professional judgment). 
 225. See, e.g., Victoria A. Shannon, The Impact of Third-Party Funders on the Parties 
They Decline To Finance, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (July 6, 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog. 
com/blog/2015/07/06/the-impact-of-third-party-funders-on-the-parties-they-decline-to-
finance/ [hereinafter Shannon, Impact] (“As a sophisticated potential investor, the funder 
invests considerable time, money, and effort into performing a thorough legal and financial 
analysis of the case during the due diligence period.  Thus, the funder is extremely well 
positioned to offer a preliminary case assessment . . . .”). 
 226. See id. (“I also predict that as the number of third-party funders and parties who 
seek funding grows, the most significant aggregate effect will be a dramatic increase in the 
number of better-informed parties, regardless of whether those parties actually receive third-
party funding.”). 
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the client) would give full-service consulting services or 
multidisciplinary services in partnership with law firms. 
 A second benefit is that when the funder-law firm partnerships 
begin to offer more diversified services rather than purely money or 
purely legal advice, future funded clients would be able to choose the 
type of arrangement that is best for their cases along more of a 
spectrum rather than a binary “funding or nothing” model.  At one 
end of the spectrum, a client could choose to keep a much larger 
percentage of the judgment, award, or settlement in the case by hiring 
a pure funder who offers no consulting, advising, or legal services.  
This arrangement would resemble Diagram A.228  At the other end of 
the spectrum, a client could choose a funder-law firm partnership that 
offers a more robust menu of services—including guidance, advice, 
and mentorship—in exchange for giving the funder a larger 
percentage of the judgment, award, or settlement.  This arrangement 
would resemble Diagram D.229  In the end, this could become a 
lucrative symbiotic relationship, providing clients not only access to 
funding for adversarial processes but also access to general settlement 
services for a wider variety of dispute resolution procedures.  Future 
funders partnered with law firms may even be willing to fund pure 
mediations; whereas under the current structure, for-profit funding of 
pure mediation is not economically viable.230 
 A third benefit is that this structure is workable for both 
consumer and commercial funding clients as well as for both 
commercial and noncommercial claims.231  In this structure, the 
original party would remain the party to the case, so both consumer 
and commercial funding clients could benefit from this structure.  In 
addition, the funder-law firm partnership could take on cases seeking 
injunctive or declaratory relief, which a separate third-party funder 
would be unlikely to accept due to the lack of a damages award.  
Finally, the funder-law firm partnership would be able to take on pro 
bono cases financed by the funder as part of the law firm’s mission 
                                                 
 228. See supra Diagram A. 
 229. See supra Diagram D. 
 230. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulation, supra note 20, at 886 n.137. 
 231. This is true because the third-party funder would finance the lawyer or law firm, 
and all funded clients that remain a party to the case are represented by a lawyer or law firm.  
A funded client that does not remain a party to the case would assign its claim to the funder, 
so the lawyer would represent the funder directly rather than the underlying client.  In any 
case, the existence of an attorney-client relationship is a shared characteristic of commercial 
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under the Rules of Professional Conduct, whereas separate third-party 
funders do not normally have an economic or ethical incentive to take 
on pro bono litigation.232  This would improve the public image of 
funders and put less pressure on the finances of law firms, enabling 
law firms to take on more pro bono cases than they currently do.233 
 A fourth benefit is that, like the other T-shaped structure 
described above, this T-shaped structure solves many of the issues that 
relate to the participation of the funder in litigation or arbitration 
procedure.234  First, this structure addresses the issue of how much de 
jure or de facto control the funder can exercise over the legal 
representation.  In this structure, the funder is essentially serving as a 
coadvisor to the client along with the law firm.  In such a role, the 
funder would have significant influence over the conduct of the legal 
representation—the “means” mentioned in the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.235  Nevertheless, the funder would also have the 
same ethical duty to the client that the attorney has under the Model 
                                                 
 232. Cf. supra note 19 (giving examples of funders that already fund pro bono or 
public interest litigation). 
 233. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 5-6 (discussing attorney pro bono 
work as a type of third-party funding).  For example, many civil rights statutes grant 
attorney’s fees to a winning plaintiff, which incentivizes law firms to take on expensive, 
plaintiff-side civil rights litigation.  See, e.g., Foley Hoag Foundation, FOLEY HOAG LLP, 
http://www.foleyhoag.com/our-firm/the-foley-hoag-foundation (last visited Aug. 23, 2016) 
(providing an example of a law firm, Foley Hoag LLP, that used its windfall of attorney’s 
fees from the landmark school desegregation case, Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 
(D. Mass. 1974), to start the Foley Hoag Foundation to fund other pro bono projects and 
improve race relations in Boston).  If a funder were involved in such a case, then the funder 
could relieve some of the financial pressure on a law firm representing meritorious plaintiffs 
during the typically long litigation trajectory of civil rights cases, which would likely 
incentivize the law firm to take on more of these cases.  See Janet Buczek, Karen Stuth & 
April Faith-Slaker, ABA Standing Comm. on Pro Bono & Pub. Serv., Supporting Justice III: 
A Report on the Pro Bono Work of America’s Lawyers (2013) (detailing the findings of the 
2012 National Pro Bono Study, which indicate the degrees of pro bono work attorneys 
annually perform). 
 234. See discussion supra Part II, for a list of the issues that relate to the participation 
of the funder in litigation and arbitration procedure.  See generally Sahani, Judging Third-
Party Funding, supra note 27 (proposing rule revisions and reinterpretations to address the 
participation of the funder in litigation and arbitration procedure). 
 235. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(“With respect to the means by which the client’s objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer 
shall consult with the client as required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is 
impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.”); id. r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (“Clients normally 
defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used 
to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical 
matters.”); id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“[A] lawyer may have authority to exercise professional 
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Rules of Professional Conduct,236 which would include ensuring client 
control of the “objectives” in the case.237  Thus the funder would be 
required to put the client’s needs first and could not control the client’s 
decision making.238  In addition, the funder could be sanctioned as part 
of the law firm under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for 
not putting the client’s needs and objectives first.239  This is reasonable 
because funders are typically run by trained lawyers who are often 
still licensed when they join an existing funder or start a new funder.240  
Those lawyer principals within funders are fully aware of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or the equivalent rules of 
professional responsibility in the jurisdiction(s) in which they are 
licensed, and what would be expected of an attorney in the same 
situation.  As mentioned above, the most effective sanction on a 
funder would likely be a monetary sanction or a public reprimand due 
to the funder’s need to maintain its reputation and constrain costs in 
order to remain a viable business enterprise.241  Depending on the 
structure of the funder-law firm partnership, the funder might also 
directly or indirectly be subject to sanctions under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure 11 and 37 as part of the law firm.242  In light of the 
                                                 
 236. See id. r. 5.3 (“With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated 
with a lawyer, . . . a lawyer . . . shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the [nonlawyer’s] 
conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer [and] a lawyer shall be 
responsible for conduct of such a [nonlawyer] that would be a violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer [under certain circumstances].”); D.C. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (D.C. BAR 2007) (stating that nonlawyer owners must adhere to 
the Rules of Professional Conduct). 
 237. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“[A] 
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .  A 
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.”); id. r. 1.2 cmt. 1 
(“Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be 
served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer’s 
professional obligations.  The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a 
civil matter, must also be made by the client.”); id. r. 1.2 cmt. 2 (“[L]awyers usually defer to 
the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third 
persons who might be adversely affected.”). 
 238. See supra notes 236-237. 
 239. See supra notes 236-237. 
 240. See infra notes 307-308 and accompanying text (providing examples of well-
trained lawyers serving as principals at major third-party funders). 
 241. See discussion supra Parts I and II. 
 242. Cf. Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 433-36 (explaining 
that funders are typically not liable under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 or 37 because 
funders are not explicitly mentioned in those rules and do not present papers to the court, 
appear in court, or participate in discovery).  If the funder becomes an internal partner of the 
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foregoing, this structure would likely provide an enforcement 
mechanism to deal with the issue of the funder’s influence over the 
attorney-client relationship or the client’s decision-making authority. 
 A second benefit that relates to the participation of the funder in 
litigation or arbitration procedure is that if the funder were to choose 
to be an internal partner of the law firm, the funder would be 
classified as an attorney within the attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine privilege directly as an attorney or agent of the 
attorney; the exceptions to waiver need not be invoked.243  In fact, at 
least three states have already passed statutes providing for an 
exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product 
doctrine privilege for communications with third-party funders, 
thereby protecting client communications with funders.244  Third, the 
funder and attorney would be legally allowed to share the fees gained 
from a winning client.245  Fourth, this structure solves the question of 
whether the identity of the funder must be disclosed to the judge, 
since the funder would be part of the counsel of record in the case.246  
Fifth, this structure would make defense-side funding more viable in 
the United States, since law firms take on defense-side 
representations.247  For example, for corporate defendants who are 
clients of the firm, the funder and law firm could work with the 
client’s insurance company that would potentially pay the funded 
defendant’s judgment if the defendant loses the case.248 
                                                 
 243. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2016) (“Privileged persons . . . are the client (including a prospective client), the client’s 
lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between them, and agents of the 
lawyer who facilitate the representation.”). 
 244. Indiana, Vermont, and Nebraska have passed statutes protecting client and 
attorney communications with third-party funders.  See supra note 115. 
 245. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(prohibiting fee sharing with nonattorneys with a few exceptions, not including third-party 
funders). 
 246. This structure alone does not solve the disclosure issue for arbitration.  A new 
arbitration procedural rule would be required to mandate disclosure of the identity of the 
funder.  See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 427-33 (proposing to 
introduce a rule mandating disclosure of the funding arrangement in arbitration). 
 247. Defense-side third-party funding is already being used successfully in many other 
jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
367, 377-439 (2009) (proposing defense-side funding in the United States that would be 
similar to after-the-event insurance in Europe). 
 248. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35, at 23-24 (discussing the provisions 
of the priorities agreement that funders normally include as part of the network of contracts 
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2. Improving the Law Firm Business Model 
 There are also several ways that law firms can benefit from this 
structure.  The traditional law firm billing model and organizational 
structure has become unsustainable over the long-term future of the 
legal industry for a multitude of reasons.  For example, there is client 
pressure to cut costs and negotiate flat fees, thereby threatening the 
continuing viability of the billable hour.249  In addition, there is a 
volatile job market for new and lateral lawyers, with attorney layoffs 
ever imminent.250  Moreover, there is the unsustainable expense of 
hiring new law graduates who are not practice-ready and whom 
clients are no longer willing to pay to train.251  Furthermore, 
megafirms of over 1000 lawyers have been known to collapse under 
crushing debt and mismanagement of funds due to their inability to 
sustainably finance themselves.252  Finally, there is the increasing 
popularity of global vereins253 that must work to comply with 
regulations in a variety of jurisdictions worldwide all at once.254 
 For these and other reasons, the legal services industry is in dire 
need of restructuring and external infusions of cash from investors 
experienced in turning around underperforming businesses.255  An 
                                                                                                             
which creditors are paid if the funded claimant wins, usually with the funder taking first 
priority.  Id. 
 249. See Leigh McMullan Abramson, Is the Billable Hour Obsolete?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
15, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/billable-hours/410611/. 
 250. See Kathryn Rubino, Nationwide Layoff Watch: Biglaw Firm Cuts Headcount; 
Attorneys Among the Victims, ABOVE L. (Jan. 14, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://abovethelaw. 
com/2016/01/nationwide-layoff-watch-biglaw-firm-cuts-headcount-attorneys-among-the-
victims/. 
 251. See Jessica D. Gabel, The Lean Legal Clinic: Cost-Effective Methods of 
Implementing Experiential Education, 7 ELON L. REV. 261, 263-66 (2015). 
 252. See Rubino, supra note 250. 
 253. A Swiss verein is a law firm structure characterized by a loose association 
between multiple law firms operating in multiple jurisdictions.  See Edwin B. Reeser & 
Martin J. Foley, Are Verein-Style Law Firms Ignoring Fee-Splitting Ethics Rules?, ABA J.: 
LEGAL REBELS (Oct. 1, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/ 
are_verein-style_law_firms_ignoring_fee-splitting_ethics_rules/. 
 254. See David Lat, Be Afraid, Be Verein Afraid, ABOVE L. (Oct. 1, 2013, 4:28 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/be-afraid-be-verein-afraid/. 
 255. See, e.g., Allan Dodds Frank, The End of an Era: Why Dewey & LeBoeuf Went 
Under, FORTUNE (May 29, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://fortune.com/2012/05/29/the-end-of-an-era-
why-dewey-leboeuf-went-under/; Mark Harris, Why More Law Firms Will Go the Way of 
Dewey & LeBoeuf, FORBES (May 8, 2012, 10:32 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbes 
leadershipforum/2012/05/08/why-more-law-firms-will-go-the-way-of-dewey-leboeuf/print/; 
Noam Scheiber, The Last Days of Big Law, NEW REPUBLIC (July 21, 2013), https:// 
newrepublic.com/article/113941/big-law-firms-trouble-when-money-dries (“The money is 
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investor will only be incentivized to spend the time giving business 
management advice to the law firm if the investor can have an equity 
stake in the success of the firm.256   This subpart explains some of the 
historical reasons why today’s law firms are facing these problems 
and explains how allowing third-party funders to become internal 
partners of law firms might be one way to help solve this problem. 
 The genesis of this problem dates back hundreds of years before 
the founding of the United States when the doctrines of maintenance 
and champerty were first developed in medieval England.257  
Maintenance and champerty are medieval terms that have many 
meanings.258  For the purposes of this Article, the term maintenance 
refers to an outside individual or entity contributing money to finance 
someone else’s lawsuit, and the term champerty refers to an act of 
maintenance with the expectation of receiving some of the proceeds 
from the winning law suit, either as reimbursement or profit.259  In the 
United Kingdom and many jurisdictions within the United States, 
maintenance and champerty were once criminal offenses.260  
Contingent fees were once classified as a form of illegal champerty 
perpetrated by lawyers.261 
 In addition, at that time, English barristers were socially and 
legally barred from directly accepting payment for their services.262  
                                                                                                             
and Partner, and Also Bankrupt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/01/25/business/partner-in-a-prestigious-law-firm-and-bankrupt.html; James B. Stewart, 
Dewey’s Fall Underscores Law Firms’ New Reality, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2012), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/business/deweys-collapse-underscores-a-new-reality-for-law-
firms-common-sense.html. 
 256. See sources cited supra note 255. 
 257. See generally JONATHAN ROSE, MAINTENANCE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND, ch. 1 
(forthcoming Apr. 2017) (on file with the author) (explaining the origins of the terms 
maintenance and champerty). 
 258. See id. 
 259. See generally id. at ch. 13 (explaining how the terms maintenance and champerty 
acquired various meanings over the past several centuries). 
 260. See generally id. (summarizing how the medieval crimes of maintenance and 
champerty once viewed as “evil” became torts that carried merely civil damages penalties in 
modern times). 
 261. See generally id. (explaining that contingent fees were deemed to be a form of 
illegal champerty in England until 2013 when “damages based agreements” were legalized).  
The United States legalized attorney contingent fee arrangements several decades before 
England did.  Id. 
 262. See Why Do Barristers Wear Robes?, W. AUSTL. B. ASS’N REV., June 2005, at 
29. 
The theory is that since barristers were not openly paid for their work, clients 
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The impetus for this rule was the sentiment that barristers could not 
be seen soliciting payment in exchange for advocacy, and barristers 
could not let the amount of their payment affect the quality of their 
advocacy.263  Thus, historically, the legal practice was divided into 
barristers who advocated and solicitors who handled financial 
transactions with clients.264  Barristers still needed to earn a living, 
however, so a solution was devised whereby grateful clients would 
slip honoraria into a discreet pocket on the back of the barristers’ 
robes.265  When the barrister returned home after a day in court, he 
would remove the money from the pocket and count his earnings for 
the day.266  Hence, the mistrust for mixing financial matters with 
dispute resolution and court advocacy is an aversion that runs 
centuries deep in the ethos of the common law tradition. 
                                                                                                             
preserve their dignity.  From this is derived a ‘backhand payment’. If barristers 
could not see how much they were being paid, the quality of their advocacy in 
court could not be compromised. Alternatively, barristers’ performances depended 
on their fee being topped up in such rear pocket, a process which did not disturb 
the flow of their delivery. 
Id. 
What do Barristers have to do with the term “receiving a backhander”?  If any of 
you have had a chance to examine a barristers gown you will notice a strange and 
seemingly useless triangular scrap of cloth attached to the shoulder, a number of 
theories exist regarding the origin of this anomaly, yet the commonly accepted one 
was that in the early middle ages this was where the barrister’s fees were placed, 
apparently it wasn’t the done thing to pay barristers for their work so to preserve 
their dignity the clients would place their payments into this pocket and since they 
could not see how much they were being paid their level of advocacy was not 
compromised or based upon financial reasoning.  Because it was done behind their 
back it was often referred to as a backhander and though the modern usage is quite 
different, it has its roots in this archaic quirk of the Bar. 
Thomas E. Kingston, Why Do Barristers Never Shake Hands? (and Other Interesting Bar 
Related Facts), LEXISWEB.CO.UK (Sept. 13, 2012), http://lexisweb.co.uk/content/why-do-
barristers-never-shake-hands-and-other-interesting-bar-related-facts. 
 263. See supra note 262. 
 264. This rule was changed in 2004 to allow barristers to accept payment from clients 
directly under certain circumstances.  See Public Access Work: Guidance for Barristers, 
LEGAL SERVICES BOARD 3 (Feb. 2010), http://www.legalservicesboard.org.uk/what_we_ 
do/regulation/pdf/public_access_guidance_for_barristers_2.pdf (“The Code of Conduct has 
been amended to permit barristers in self-employed practice to undertake work on direct 
instructions from lay clients, without the need for a solicitor or other professional client to be 
instructed.”); The Public Access Scheme: Guidance for Barristers, B. STANDARDS BOARD 
(Apr. 2013), http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/media/205214/guidance_for_barristers_08_04_13 
_final.pdf; cf. supra note 262 (revealing that, historically, barristers were barred from directly 
accepting payment for their work). 
 265. See sources cited supra notes 255, 262. 
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 As a sign of the changing times and shifting sentiments, in 2004 
the United Kingdom began to allow barristers to accept payment 
directly from their clients.267  Furthermore, the U.K. Legal Services 
Act 2007 authorized “alternative business structures” in which 
nonlawyers could become partial owners of law firms, and this 
provision took effect in 2013.268  This provision allows nonlawyers to 
have partial (but not complete) ownership in law firms and permits 
law firms to be publicly traded on stock exchanges.269  As mentioned 
above, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 found in its 2011 study 
that “alternative business structures” involving nonlawyer ownership 
of law firms are allowed in the District of Columbia, England and 
Wales, Scotland, Australia, two provinces in Canada, Germany, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and other jurisdictions around the world.270 
 The United Kingdom allows not only “alternative business 
structures” but also the self-regulation of third-party funding.  The 
third-party funding industry in the United Kingdom has created the 
Association of Litigation Funders, “an independent body that has 
been charged by the Ministry of Justice, through the Civil Justice 
Council, with delivering self-regulation of litigation funding in 
England and Wales.”271  This combination of “alternative business 
structures” and self-regulating third-party funders uniquely positions 
the United Kingdom to allow experimentation in third-party funders 
serving as internal partners or nonlawyer partial owners of law firms.  
Indeed, one third-party funder—Burford—has already benefited from 
this experimental environment by creating its own law firm in 
England named Burford Law.272 
 As a former English colony, the United States inherited 
England’s legal system, including its historical mistrust for mixing 
financial matters with dispute resolution and court advocacy.  
However, the historical experience of the U.S. legal industry with 
respect to the separation of law firms from financial interests arises in 
a different context.273  Unlike the United Kingdom, the United States 
                                                 
 267. See sources cited supra note 262. 
 268. See supra note 159. 
 269. See supra note 159. 
 270. See ABA Memo, supra note 221. 
 271. About Us, ASS’N LITIG. FUNDERS, http://associationoflitigationfunders.com/ 
about-us/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2016). 
 272. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text (discussing third-party funder 
Burford’s creation of a law firm called “Burford Law”). 
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has a unified bar in which every licensed attorney can advocate in 
court, engage in transactional work, and negotiate their own fee 
arrangements with their clients.  In the United States, the separation 
of law firms from financial interests instead arises in the context of 
attorney contingency fee agreements and the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct.274  Contingency fees were prohibited in the 
United States from the nation’s founding until the mid-twentieth 
century due to maintenance and champerty restrictions that the 
individual states had inherited from the English common law 
tradition.275 
 Gradually, changes in attitudes about the ability of lawyers to 
contribute to increasing access to the courthouse through contingent 
fees led to the repeal of the prohibition against contingent fees in all 
jurisdictions within the United States.276  Today, one almost takes for 
granted that contingent fees are permissible throughout the United 
States.277  Many countries worldwide that allow third-party funding 
still prohibit contingent fees, and third-party funding arguably serves 
as a substitute for contingent fees in those jurisdictions.278  Some of 
those jurisdictions allow attorneys to charge “conditional” fees under 
which the attorney receives at least some payment from the client 
regardless of the outcome of the case, or “success” fees by which the 
attorney receives an extra or “uplift” payment upon winning the case, 
on top of the attorney’s normal fee.279  The United States does not 
formally recognize conditional or success fees, but many such 
arrangements are possible under the existing flexibility allowed 
regarding an attorney’s negotiation of his or her fee agreements.280  
One flexibility that is not allowed, however, is an excessively high 
                                                 
 274. Gregory R. Hanthorn, Ethical Principles Applicable to Alternative Fee 
Arrangements and Related Areas, ABA (Apr. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac_2012/17-1_ethics_surrounding_attorneys_ 
fees.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 275. See supra notes 257-261 and accompanying text. 
 276. See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, The History of Contingency and the Contingency 
of History, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 261 (1998); Adam Shajnfeld, A Critical Survey of the Law, 
Ethics, and Economics of Attorney Contingent Fee Arrangements, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
773 (2009-2010); Arthur L. Kraut, Comment, Contingent Fee: Champerty or Champion?, 21 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 15 (1972). 
 277. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 278. See generally NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35 (discussing the allowance 
or prohibition of contingent attorney fees in various jurisdictions worldwide). 
 279. See, e.g., id. at 98 (explaining how success fees are used in the United Kingdom). 
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contingency fee.281  Every state has some sort of cap or limit on the 
contingency fee that an attorney may legally charge, which may be 
memorialized in that state’s attorney ethics rules or state statutes.282 
 All states except California model their attorney ethics rules 
after the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.283  The first 
version of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct was 
developed by the Commission on Evaluation of Professional 
Standards, also known as the Kutak Commission, named for its Chair, 
Robert J. Kutak.284  The Commission initially proposed a version of 
Rule 5.4 that allowed nonlawyers to have ownership or managerial 
authority in law firms and share fees with lawyers, but this proposal 
was rejected by the ABA.285  After vigorous debate and strong 
opposition from the ABA Committee on Unauthorized Practice of 
Law, the ABA instead adopted a version of Rule 5.4 banning 
nonlawyer partners and fee sharing with nonlawyers.286  To date, this 
                                                 
 281. Cf. id. (suggesting the fee relationship between clients and their lawyers). 
 282. See, e.g., Courthouse Cornerstone: Contingency Fees and Their Importance for 
Everyday Americans, CTR. FOR JUST. & DEMOCRACY 304, app. at 1-8 (Jan. 2013), 
https://centerjd.org/system/files/contingencyWPFull.pdf (summarizing various studies on the 
rates of contingen[cy] fees in the United and confirming ABA findings that “straight 
contingent fees typically range from 25% to 33%”). 
 283. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2016) (“To date, California is the only state that does not have 
professional conduct rules that follow the format of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”).  Puerto Rico has also declined to adopt the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  See Alberto Bernabe, Supreme Court of Puerto Rico Rejects Proposal To Adopt 
ABA Model Rules, PROF. RESP. BLOG (Oct. 18, 2014), http://bernabepr.blogspot.com/ 
2014/10/supreme-court-of-puerto-rico-rejects.html. 
 284. See Justin Schiff, The Changing Nature of the Law Firm: Amending Model Rule 
5.4 To Allow for Alternative Business Structures Resulting in Nonlawyer Ownership of Law 
Firms, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 1009, 1013 (2014); Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra 
note 283 (“This Legislative History traces the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model 
Rules) from the appointment of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional 
Standards (‘Kutak Commission’) in 1977 through the year 2005.”). 
 285. Schiff, supra note 284, at 1013-15. 
 286. See Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals 
Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 390-91 (1988). 
[T]he ABA Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law was the first body 
within the ABA to voice its opposition to the Kutak proposal.  Beyond raising the 
specter of nonlawyer ownership or management of a law firm, the committee 
pointed to the decision in The Florida Bar v. Consolidated Business and Legal 
Forms, Inc., as evidence that the Kutak Commission proposal strayed from existing 
case law, rather than restating it.  The committee further warned of the proposal’s 
dangers: “The Commission’s proposed Rule 5.4 fails to confront numerous needs 
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version of Rule 5.4 has been adopted throughout the United States, 
with the notable exception of the District of Columbia, which instead 
adopted a revised version of the Kutak Committee’s Rule 5.4 allowing 
nonlawyer partners and fee sharing with nonlawyers in a limited 
form.287  The District of Columbia likely adopted its unique 
                                                                                                             
quality of the ultimate legal product, protecting the client-lawyer relationship and 
files in the event of the resignation or discharge of an employee, minimizing the 
impact of compensation structures on potential conflicts of loyalty to the client and 
to the employer, and preventing other incursions by an unqualified owner or 
manager into the lawyer’s sphere of judgment and duty.” 
 . . . . 
 The ABA Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practiced of the Law, 
notwithstanding its earlier objections, did not recommend deleting Rule 5.4 in 
favor of a total ban on nonlawyer involvement in entities offering legal services.  
Rather, the committee submitted an amendment proposing that Rule 5.4 be limited 
to prohibit firms from offering “an interest in the law firm to nonlawyers on a 
public financing basis.”  The General Practice Section, however, carried the banner 
of tradition, and ultimately it was that section’s proposal—continuing the historical 
bans against sharing legal fees and forming law partnerships with nonlawyers—
that was adopted verbatim by the House of Delegates as Model Rule 5.4. 
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 287. Cf. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 286, at 392-93. 
 In the District of Columbia, a D.C. Bar committee chaired by Robert Jordan 
of Steptoe & Johnson took on the mission of thoroughly reviewing and, in many 
cases, proposing revisions of the Model Rules for consideration by the bar’s Board 
of Governors. 
 Jordan Committee members were receptive to the idea of innovative 
affiliations.  Mark Lynch, then an attorney with the American Civil Liberties 
Union (and now with Covington & Burling), was the member who authored a 
redraft of the Kutak Commission’s Rule 5.4.  As he would later explain, the 
committee perceived a market demand for one-stop shopping—for collaborative 
services of lawyers with such other professionals as accountants, lobbyists, social 
workers and economists.  And they apparently saw no reason why that demand 
should not be met, as long as the lawyer’s professional integrity and the lawyer-
client relationship were adequately protected. 
 . . . . 
 What had been presented to the committee was a legal clinic brochure that 
listed “family and individual counseling,” among other “special services” offered.  
The committee noted that apparently the nonlegal services could be furnished to 
clients of the firm “not merely in connection with legal services provided to the 
same clients, but also independently of any legal services.”  The committee 
reasoned that “the ethical restrictions on collaborative enterprises involving both 
lawyers and nonlawyers are concerned only with preventing improper lay 
involvement in the professional activities of lawyers and are not addressed to 
activities that do not constitute the practice of law, even if lawyers are in some 
manner involved in such activities.” 
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 This rule rejects an absolute prohibition against lawyers and nonlawyers 
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formulation of Rule 5.4 due to the “revolving door” of politics, 
whereby influential nonlawyer government officials, lobbyists, 
economists, and politicians are then hired into law firms as partners 
when their political appointments or elected terms end and they have 
to leave government service.288  The law firms that hire these former 
government officials hope that they will be “rainmakers” for the firm 
by using their many connections to generate business for the firm in 
exchange for all the benefits that go along with being a law firm 
partner, including profit sharing.289  The proverbial “sky” has not 
fallen in D.C. due to its anomalous Rule 5.4.290  Still, this exception 
only exists in D.C., and all the other jurisdictions in the United States 
have adopted the same substantive position as the Model Rules 
prohibiting partnerships with nonlawyers, fee sharing with 
nonlawyers, and the practice of law by nonlawyers.291 
 When detailing the history of how the District of Columbia came 
to adopt a revised version of the Kutak Commission’s Rule 5.4, Susan 
Gilbert and Larry Lempert’s 1988 article provides the most poignant 
explanation of the ethos of the D.C. Bar committee chaired by Robert 
Jordan of Steptoe & Johnson, known as the “Jordan Committee”: 
 What the Jordan Committee was challenging—with good 
cause—was the notion that the lawyer-nonlawyer relationship had to be 
one of employer and employee.  Just as lawyers are professionals, so too 
are economists, psychologists, accountants, and lobbyists, to name a 
few.  A nonlawyer professional with substantial experience in his or her 
                                                                                                             
traditional ethical requirements with respect to the organization thus created.  Thus, 
a lawyer may practice law in an organization where nonlawyers hold a financial 
interest or exercise managerial authority, but only [if the requirements of this rule 
are met]. 
D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 cmt. 4 (D.C. BAR 2007); see also id. r. 5.4 cmt. 7 
(“For example, the rule permits . . . nonlawyer lobbyists to work with lawyers who perform 
legislative services . . . .”). 
 288. See supra note 287. 
 289. See, e.g., John Latimer, Retiring Congressman Jim Gerlach Hired by High-
Powered D.C. Law Firm, TIMES HERALD (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.timesherald.com/ 
article/JR/20141229/NEWS/141229893; Joseph Morton, Lee Terry No Stranger to D.C. Law 
Firm He’s Joining as Senior Adviser, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www. 
omaha.com/news/nebraska/lee-terry-no-stranger-to-d-c-law-firm-he/article_d980c7b6-9a88-
11e4-8e9b-7f70a236e1fc.html. 
 290. See, e.g., Carolyn Elefant, Is Starting a New Kind of Law Firm as Easy as Riding 
a Bike?, MYSHINGLE (Feb. 26, 2014), http://myshingle.com/2014/02/articles/client-relations/ 
starting-new-kind-law-firm-easy-riding-bike/. 
 291. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016), with 
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field, who could be a partner in a venture with others in the same 
profession, might well resist joining a law firm as an employee.  
Employees can be well-paid, but partnership also brings prestige and a 
measure of power: one has equity in the firm, access to its financial 
data, a voice in its decision-making and is regarded as belonging on a 
senior level.292 
 Philosophically, the question of whether a third-party funder 
should be allowed to be an internal partner of a law firm echoes this 
debate.  Like the Jordan Committee of the 1980s, this Article 
challenges long-held assumptions about the appropriate relationship 
between law firms and nonlawyers who provide professional services 
to their clients related to the subject matter of the same lawsuit. 
 With respect to the ABA’s Model Rule 5.4, surprisingly, none of 
the prohibitions are absolute; each has well-defined exceptions to 
support clear policy goals.293  For example, Rule 5.4 allows a law firm 
to share fees with a nonlawyer employed by the firm through a 
compensation or retirement program as long as the nonlawyers are not 
owners of the firm and the firm’s sole business is the practice of law.294  
The Rule also allows a law firm or individual lawyer to “share court-
awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, 
retained or recommended employment of the [law firm or] lawyer in 
the matter.”295  The Rule also allows an in-house corporate counsel to 
practice law by representing the corporation, even though part of the 
lawyer’s fee comes from an entity whose core business is not 
practicing law.296 
 Other examples can be found in the Comments to Model Rule 
5.5; the Rule governs the unauthorized practice of law and the 
multijurisdictional practice of law, which occurs when lawyers 
licensed in one state may render legal services in another state in 
which they are not licensed without violating the rule against the 
unauthorized practice of law.297  The Comments to Rule 5.5 identify 
several exceptions to this Rule that allow the participation of 
nonlawyers in assisting in the practice of law.298  Comment 2 implies 
that the Model Rules do not define the practice of law by stating that 
                                                 
 292. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 286, at 394. 
 293. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 294. See id. r. 5.4(a)(3). 
 295. See id. r. 5.4(a)(4). 
 296. See id. r. 5.4(d)(2). 
 297. See id. r. 5.5. 
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“[t]he definition of the practice of law is established by [state] law and 
varies from one jurisdiction to another.”299  Comment 2 also expressly 
provides that lawyers may “employ[] the services of paraprofessionals 
and delegat[e] functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the 
delegated work and retains responsibility for their work.”300  This 
implies that those paraprofessionals may perform “delegate[d] 
functions” of the practice of law as long as they are supervised by 
attorneys.301  Comment 3 states that lawyers “may provide professional 
advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires 
knowledge of the law” and that lawyers may even “assist independent 
nonlawyers, such as paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law 
of a jurisdiction to provide particular law-related services” and 
“nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se.”302  This supports the belief 
that nonlawyers authorized to practice certain types of law and 
lawyers advising such nonlawyer practitioners are more widespread 
than the wording of Model Rule 5.5 itself would suggest.303 
 Furthermore, the federal government and some states have 
created statutory exceptions for nonlawyers to carry out some 
activities that would normally be considered the practice of law, but 
only under appropriate supervision.304  For example, nonlawyer 
accountants may appear and represent clients in federal tax court.305  
Similarly, Washington State adopted a rule allowing nonattorney 
Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLTs), “who meet certain 
educational requirements to advise and assist clients in approved 
practice areas of law.”306 
                                                 
 299. See id. r. 5.5 cmt. 2. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See id. r. 5.5 cmt. 3. 
 303. Id. 
 304. See infra notes 305-306 and accompanying text. 
 305. See Katherine D. Black & Stephen T. Black, A National Tax Bar: An End to the 
Attorney-Accountant Tax Turf War, 36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 39-40 (2004) (“Even though this 
type of representation would seem to be the quintessential definition of the ‘practice of law,’ 
the U.S. Tax Court, pursuant to its Rule 200(a), allows nonlawyers to appear and represent 
clients before it.  The other two trial courts which hear federal tax cases do not.”) (internal 
footnotes omitted).  The Author thanks Brant Hellwig for this insight. 
 306. Anna L. Endter & A.J. Blechner, Washington Limited License Legal Technician 
(LLLT) Research Guide, GALLAGHER L. LIBR., https://lib.law.washington.edu/content/ 
guides/llltguide (last updated Aug. 20, 2015); see also Robert Ambrogi, Washington State 
Moves Around UPL, Using Legal Technicians To Help Close the Justice Gap, ABA J. (Jan. 
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 None of those exceptions can apply to third-party funders, 
however, according to the way in which those rules and exceptions are 
currently worded.  To modify these rules to allow third-party funders 
to participate in firm ownership, profit sharing, and client advising 
might be justified for several reasons.  First, the vast majority of third-
party funders either were founded by attorneys, have attorneys within 
their partnership structures, or have attorneys on their advisory boards 
evaluating potential case investments and giving the funder guidance 
regarding which cases to accept and which to reject.307  In fact, third-
party funders actively recruit the most talented lawyers away from law 
firms and dispute resolution institutions.308  Many of those attorneys-
turned-funders keep their bar licenses active, although they are not 
directly practicing law.309  In essence, lawyering and legal services are 
part of the ownership and management structure of third-party 
funders already.310 
 Second, some funders advise potential funding clients regarding 
why their cases were rejected, which helps better inform those clients 
should they choose to pursue their cases using other financial 
means.311  In light of this, one could argue that funders are already 
giving some form of legal advice within the narrow context of the 
funder informing a rejected potential funding client regarding the 
reasons for the rejection.312 
 Third, practicing attorneys can already legally do the job of a 
funder—namely, provide dispute financing to their clients in a variety 
                                                 
 307. For example, a majority of the members of Gerchen Keller Capital’s 
management and operations teams are well-trained lawyers.  See Team, GERCHEN KELLER, 
http://www.gerchenkeller.com/who-we-are/team/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2016) (“Gerchen 
Keller’s team offers a unique blend of backgrounds in law and finance, including former 
commercial litigators and transactional attorneys, Supreme Court law clerks, investment 
bankers and portfolio managers, and in-house counsel at Fortune 500 companies.”).  
Similarly, the former Chairman of the International Court of Arbitration (ICA), who had 
previously spent 30 years litigating at the international law firm Clifford Chance, joined the 
investment advisory panel of Woodsford Litigation Funding, a London-based litigation 
funder.  See Leo Szolnoki, Beechey To Advise Third-Party Funder, GLOBAL ARB. REV. 
(Nov. 5. 2013), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32028/. 
 308. See supra note 307. 
 309. See generally Michele DeStefano, Compliance and Claim Funding: Testing the 
Borders of Lawyers’ Monopoly and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2961 (2014) (analyzing unauthorized practice of law statutes and concluding that “claim 
funders” could be viewed as practicing law). 
 310. Id. 
 311. See Shannon, Impact, supra note 225. 
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of forms, beyond the contingency fee.313  However, law firms could 
benefit from the extra infusion of cash and business expertise that an 
active partner, like a third-party funder, could offer.314 
 Fourth, the one type of dispute-related financing that an attorney 
is not allowed to provide to his or her client is living expenses while 
the case is pending, which is prohibited by ABA Model Rule 1.8(e), 
although it is allowed in a small minority of states.315  Funders are 
already filling that gap by providing living expenses to clients who 
cannot afford to wait until the case ends and the judgment is 
collected.316 
 Fifth, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 issued an 
informational report to the House of Delegates in 2012 about 
“alternative litigation finance,” which stated that lawyers have a duty 
to become knowledgeable about third-party funding enough to advise 
their clients or to “associate with experienced counsel when advising 
clients who are entering into these transactions.”317  If the third-party 
                                                 
 313. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); Mark A. 
Robertson, Marketing Alternative Fee Arrangements, ABA (Sept./Oct. 2011), http://www. 
americanbar.org/publications/law_practice_magazine/2011/september_october/alternative_fe
e_arrangements.html. 
 314. See supra subpart IV.B.2, for a discussion of the reasons why law firms need an 
infusion of cash and business expertise. 
 315. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  The 
jurisdictions that allow attorneys to loan their clients living or medical expenses with varying 
levels of restrictions and limitations include Alabama, Arizona, California, the District of 
Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, and possibly Georgia.  See, e.g., Cristina D. Lockwood, Adhering to 
Professional Obligations: Amending ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(e) to 
Allow for Humanitarian Loans to Existing Clients, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 457, 494-98 (2014); 
Susan Michmerhuizen, Ethics Tip: Financial Assistance to Clients, ABA (Sept. 2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/services/ethicsearch/ethicstip
september2015.html (describing the variations in Rule 1.8 among various state bars); ABA 
CPR Policy Implementation Comm., Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct: Rule 1.8: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules, ABA, http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_8.authc
heckdam.pdf (last updated May 13, 2015) (describing the variations in Rule 1.8 among 
various state bars). 
 316. See, e.g., Tina Burns, Wreck Victim: Consumer Legal Funding Needs Protection 
from Alabama Legislature, ARC LEGAL FUNDING (May 24, 2015), http://arclegalfunding. 
org/wreck-victim-consumer-legal-funding-needs-protection-from-alabama-legislature/. 
I finally got some relief when I contacted a legal funding company and was able to 
get the money I needed to keep the power on and to put food on the table for my 
children.  It was a huge relief to know there was someone out there who could help 
me. 
Id. 
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funder is allowed to partner directly with the law firm or become a 
partial owner of the law firm, ensuring competent advising of the 
client would be easier.318  Of course, there would be the potential for 
self-serving advice from the third-party funder, so it would be a best 
practice for the funder-law firm joint venture to advise the client to 
obtain independent legal advice regarding the transaction.319  However, 
if states adopt a formulation of Rule 5.4 that is similar to the D.C. 
Rule 5.4, then a nonlawyer—such as a third-party funder—who 
becomes a partial owner in a law firm is required to agree to abide by 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, which mandate a duty of loyalty to 
the client, and the law firm—and therefore the funder as a partner of 
that law firm—could be sanctioned for violating that duty.320 
 In light of the foregoing, it would be reasonable for states to 
consider allowing third-party funders that have lawyers among their 
principal partners to combine with law firms to form a 
multidisciplinary practice that provides joint legal representation and 
dispute financing services to clients or to become partial owners of 
law firms.  The United Kingdom and the District of Columbia have 
somewhat relaxed their prohibitions on nonlawyers sharing fees and 
partially owning law firms, and a handful of states in the United 
States have expressly allowed the limited practice of law by 
nonlawyers in order to increase access to legal services for low-
income or indigent clients.321  Thus state legislatures should feel 
                                                                                                             
 Lawyers who are not experienced in dealing with these funding transactions 
must become fully informed about the legal risks and benefits of these 
transactions, in order to provide competent advice to clients.  Because this is a new 
and highly specialized area of finance, it may be necessary for a lawyer to 
undertake additional study or associate with experienced counsel when advising 
clients who are entering into these transactions. 
Id. 
 318. Cf. Shannon, Impact, supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing the 
current practice of some funders to give reasons to clients that they decline to finance). 
 319. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (requiring 
attorneys to advise clients to seek independent legal advice before entering into business 
transactions with attorneys); ABA White Paper, supra note 32, at 18. 
 320. See supra notes 235-237, 242 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra note 159 (identifying the U.K. approach of allowing nonlawyer 
ownership of law firms through “alternative business structures” under the Legal Service Act 
of 2007); supra note 160 (identifying the District of Columbia approach of allowing 
nonlawyer ownership of law firms and allowing nonlawyers to share fees in limited 
circumstances under Rule 5.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct); supra note 306 
(identifying Washington State’s approach to allow nonlawyers to practice law in a limited 
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justified if they choose to adopt a rule similar to the District of 
Columbia to allow nonlawyers to serve as internal partners within law 
firms.322  In turn, by authorizing funders to share fees, share 
ownership, make business decisions, and advise clients in partnership 
with law firms, the existing regulatory regime that applies to law 
firms would be extended to funders as quasi-law firm participants in 
the legal system.323  In addition, allowing third-party funders to take an 
equity stake in law firms or form multidisciplinary partnerships with 
law firms will make third-party funding accessible to more types of 
cases, including class actions and pro bono cases.324 
3. Drawbacks to the Proposed Structure 
 There are several troubling drawbacks to this proposed structure.  
The most important drawback to this structure is that it does not solve 
the problem of collusion between the attorney and the funder to the 
detriment of the client—in fact, multidisciplinary practice or 
nonlawyer ownership of law firms may even exacerbate this 
problem.325  This problem could be mitigated by extending the Rules 
                                                 
 322. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4 (D.C. BAR 2007). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 342-43 (2010). 
 A structure in which the class has both a class counsel and a separate 
litigation funder is inherently one in which “agents are watching agents.”  This has 
advantages, as the litigation funder would be in a position to monitor the attorney, 
while both the representative plaintiff (often a nonprofit organization in Europe) 
and class counsel could negotiate the financial arrangement with the third-party 
funding firm. 
Id. (internal footnote omitted); see also supra note 19; cf. Deborah R. Hensler, Third-Party 
Financing of Class Action Litigation in the United States: Will the Sky Fall?, 63 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 499, 525 (2014) (“Neither anecdotal evidence of third-party litigation investors’ 
strategies in the United States, nor contemporary U.S. class action jurisprudence, nor 
empirical data on trends in Australian class actions, suggest that the sky will fall any time 
soon should third-party litigation financing migrate to the class action domain in the United 
States.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in 
Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561, 585 (2014) (“On this view, third-party 
litigation funding may reduce the agency risk in representative litigation not so much by 
opening the pool of capital available for the prosecution of class claims, but by introducing a 
genuinely motivated monitor of class counsel performance with interests that align, albeit 
imperfectly, with those of the represented class.  The approach clearly differs from the 
PSLRA [1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act], CAFA [Class Action Fairness Act 
of 2005], or the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 in inviting a market actor to serve as an 
intermediary agent.”). 
 325. See Corinne N. Lalli, Comment, Multidisciplinary Practices: The Ultimate 
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of Professional Conduct to the funder via its multidisciplinary 
practice with the law firm and by explicitly stating that the funder 
could be sanctioned under the Rules of Professional Conduct for not 
putting the client’s interests first.326  Alternatively, new Professional 
Conduct rules specifically for funders could be developed.327  Either 
option may prove to be a workable solution to this drawback if 
accompanied by an appropriate enforcement mechanism for funders, 
similar to bar disciplinary actions and court-imposed sanctions on 
attorneys.328 
                                                                                                             
A primary reason for the Bar Association’s vehement stance against a fully 
integrated MDP [multidisciplinary practice] is the fear that it would violate the 
three core legal values: professional independence of judgment; protection of 
confidential client information; and loyalty to clients through the avoidance of 
conflicts of interest.  Non-lawyers, in their interpretation of Lawyer’s Code for 
Professional Responsibility, are more likely to be influenced by economic 
considerations and are less inclined to uphold the integrity of the legal system. 
Id. (internal footnotes omitted). 
 326. This may be a potential solution because the most prominent litigation funders 
around the world were founded or cofounded by lawyers or have lawyers serving as 
principals.  See, e.g., Rebecca Lowe, Speculate and Arbitrate To Accumulate, INT’L B. ASS’N 
(Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=804e46e3-dfc0-4966-
b16e-31627803970c (“Burford Capital, the world’s biggest litigation funder, was founded by 
former Time Warner General Counsel Chris Bogart and former Latham & Watkins partner 
Selvyn Seidel in 2009.”).  Thus, to the extent that any principals at litigation funding 
companies are licensed attorneys or give legal advice as part of their work at litigation 
funding companies, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct could potentially apply to their 
conduct. 
 327. See Third Party Funding: Code for Conduct for Litigation Funders, CTS. & 
TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/related-offices-and-bodies/advisory-
bodies/cjc/third-party-funding/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2016) (setting out the code for conduct 
for litigation funders in the United Kingdom); cf. Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, 
ASS’N LIT. FUNDERS ENG. & WALES (Nov. 2011), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/CJC/Publications/CJC+papers/Code+of+Conduct+for+Li
tigation+Funders+(November+2011).pdf (illustrating a code of conduct for litigation funders 
in the United Kingdom, which authorizes U.K. funders to govern themselves).  This Author 
has proposed elsewhere that a similar code should be developed for funders in the United 
States.  See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Governing Third-Party Funders [hereinafter Sahani, 
Governing] (forthcoming) (on file with author).  Rather than self-governance, however, there 
would need to be an external enforcement mechanism—similar to attorney disciplinary 
mechanisms—in order to combat third-party funders colluding with attorneys.  Id. 
 328. See Sahani, Governing, supra note 327 (setting out the code for conduct for 
litigation funders in the United Kingdom); cf. Cydney Batchelor, Disciplinary Actions: 
When Bad Things Happen to Good Lawyers, ABA (Oct./Nov. 2006), http://www.american 
bar.org/content/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index/ 
disciplinaryactions.html (advising lawyers regarding responding to a complaint notice from 
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 A second drawback is that this structure does not solve the 
question of who would pay security for costs or adverse costs awards 
on behalf of the client.329  Currently, third-party funders may agree to 
pay security for costs or adverse costs awards when operating in 
jurisdictions or arbitrations that apply the “loser pays” rule to cost 
allocation.330  Law firms, however, typically do not pay cost awards on 
behalf of their clients.331  Perhaps in a multidisciplinary practice, the 
funder might still agree to pay costs, as is common in traditional third-
party funding transactions where the underlying case will be pursued 
in a jurisdiction or forum that follows the “loser pays” rule of cost 
allocation. 
 From the funder’s perspective, a third drawback relates to the 
funder’s potential liability for sanctions due to violations made by the 
law firm.332  For example, if the funder enters into a partnership or 
multidisciplinary practice arrangement with a law firm, then the 
funder could be partly liable if the law firm is sanctioned for violating 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 or 37 while conducting a funded 
case.333  Federal Rules 11 and 37 do contemplate sanctioning party 
representatives or attorneys, and the funder may fall into this category 
                                                 
 329. See supra note 176 (citing sources discussing in what contexts a third-party 
funder may pay costs orders if the funded party loses the case). 
 330. See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 439-40 (discussing 
how arbitral tribunals handle the issue of security for costs and adverse costs awards when 
applying a “loser pays” rule in cases involving third-party funders).  See generally 
NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 35 (discussing how arbitral tribunals handle the issue of 
security for costs and adverse costs awards when applying a “loser pays” rule in cases 
involving third-party funders in various jurisdictions around the world). 
 331. Under the terms of a contingency fee agreement or pro bono retainer, an attorney 
may finance a client’s litigation expenses and costs up front.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.8(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  Otherwise, an attorney does not normally pay the 
client’s litigation expenses and costs without the promise of reimbursement.  Id. 
[There is no] prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs and litigation 
expenses, including the expenses of medical examination and the costs of 
obtaining and presenting evidence, because these advances are virtually 
indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts.  
Similarly, an exception allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court 
costs and litigation expenses regardless of whether these funds will be repaid is 
warranted. 
Id. r. 1.8(e) cmt. 10. 
 332. See Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, supra note 27, at 433-36 (explaining 
that funders are typically not liable under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 or 37 because 
funders are not explicitly mentioned in those rules and do not present papers to the court, 
appear in court, or participate in discovery). 
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under a partnership or multidisciplinary practice arrangement with a 
law firm.334  As a potential solution, the law firm and the funder can 
stipulate in their agreement that the funder will not present papers or 
make representations to the court or arbitrator and that the law firm 
alone would be liable to cover the amount of any sanctions ordered by 
a court or arbitrator.  It is possible that this will somewhat insulate the 
funder from paying sanctions while still enabling the coadvisor 
structure for third-party funding arrangements.  However, a court or 
arbitrator still has the power to order sanctions against an attorney or 
law firm directly under the current rules, so the agreement may not be 
completely effective at insulating the funder acting as an internal 
partner of the law firm.335  To provide for this possibility, the funder 
and law firm can stipulate in their agreement that the law firm will 
reimburse the funder for any sanctions levied directly against the 
funder if the law firm was solely responsible for the offending 
conduct.  This would serve the purpose of effectively insulating the 
funder from paying sanctions for any conduct for which it was not 
responsible. 
 A fourth drawback is that since attorney ethics rules and statutes 
defining the practice of law are implemented on a state-by-state basis, 
it would be extremely difficult to convince states to adopt uniform 
revisions.336  The first logical step would be to revise Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 5.4 regarding law firm ownership and fee 
sharing as well as state laws defining the practice of law, none of 
which seem likely.337  The ABA Ethics 20/20 Commission recently 
                                                 
 334. See id. 
 335. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (authorizing sanctions and parties and their legal counsel 
relating to signed pleadings, motions, and other papers presented the court or representations 
made to the court); id. R. 37 (authorizing sanctions for failure to comply with discovery 
requests or orders). 
 336. Cf. States Making Amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct: 
Dates of Adoption, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/chrono_list_state_adopting_model_rules.
html (last visited Aug. 28, 2016) (showing dates of states adopting amendments to the Model 
Rules ranging from 1988 to 2010 suggesting that it is difficult to get states to uniformly adopt 
new changes promulgated by the ABA).  In addition, California—one of the largest legal 
markets in the United States—has not adopted the Model Rules at all.  See Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, supra note 283 (“To date, California is the only state that does not have 
professional conduct rules that follow the format of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”).  Puerto Rico has also declined to adopt the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  See Bernabe, supra note 283. 
 337. See ABA Memo, supra note 221.  See generally Marc N. Biamonte, Note, 
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explored whether to allow multidisciplinary practice or nonlawyer 
ownership of law firms and decided not to modify the Model Rules 
regarding either issue.338  As mentioned above, current law prohibits 
this structure in all U.S. jurisdictions, except the District of 
Columbia.339  Thus third-party funders are not likely to become 
internal partners of law firms in the vast majority of states anytime 
soon.340 
 Despite these drawbacks, however, the D.C. Rule 5.4 might 
allow for law firms and third-party funders in the District of 
Columbia to experiment with some restricted variation of this T-
structure, so perhaps the District of Columbia could serve as a 
laboratory for other states to observe.341  In addition, the United 
Kingdom is already serving as a laboratory for nonlawyer ownership 
of law firms and multidisciplinary practices.342  As mentioned above, 
                                                                                                             
Uniformly?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1161 (2001) (analyzing proponents’ and opponents’ views 
regarding allowing multidisciplinary legal practices by amending Model Rule 5.4). 
 338. See ABA Memo, supra note 221. 
 339. Cf. Sean T. Carnathan, Is Prohibition of Non-Lawyer Ownership of Firms 
Antiquated?, LITIG. NEWS, http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/Articles-
print/071012-non-lawyer-ownership-summer12.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2016) (comparing 
the Legal Services Act in the United Kingdom that allows nonlawyer ownership of law firms 
with the Rule 5.4 prohibition on fee sharing in New York and the District of Columbia Rule 
5.4 that also allow such nonlawyer fee sharing and ownership). 
 340. Cf. James Podgers, ABA Ethics Opinion Sparks Renewed Debate over 
Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, ABA J. (Dec. 1, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www. 
abajournal.com/magazine/Article/aba_ethics_opinion_sparks_renewed_debate_over_nonlaw
yer_ownership_of_law_fi/ (“[Opponents’] concern is that any step in the direction of giving 
nonlawyers some form of ownership involvement in law firms threatens the professional 
independence that is one of the core principles of lawyering.”). 
 341. See supra notes 287, 339 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule 5.4 in the 
District of Columbia that diverges from the traditional prohibitions by allowing nonlawyers 
to become partial owners of law firms). 
 342. See, e.g., Steinitz, Pricing Legal Claims, supra note 17, at 1891; supra notes 10-
15 and accompanying text (discussing third-party funder Burford’s creation of a law firm 
called “Burford Law”). 
Moreover, experimentations with creative business structures that de facto allow 
non-lawyers to (indirectly) profit from law firms are already underway in the 
United States.  One example is Clearspire, which describes itself as having 
“reimagined everything a law firm can be [a]nd brought it to life with highly 
innovative business practices.”  Specifically, Clearspire is structured as three 
separate legal entities: a law firm, a service company (owned by nonlawyers), and 
an IT company.  Such indirect or direct investors in law firms that do any measure 
of contingency work would, one imagines, be intensely interested in placing a 
value on the legal claims in which the firm has a contingent stake. 
Steinitz, Pricing Legal Claims, supra note 17, at 1891 (internal footnotes omitted); see also 
Caroline Binham, UK’s Legal Services Act Leads to the Creation of New Business Models, 
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under the Legal Services Act 2007, the United Kingdom allows 
nonlawyer investment in law firms, a provision that took effect in 
2013.343  Thus, several major common law jurisdictions, including the 
District of Columbia, as well as the Kutak Commission that wrote the 
original ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, provide support 
for the argument that nonlawyer partners of law firms are not 
completely an outrageous idea.344  Perhaps this structure should be 
allowed on an experimental basis in whichever states might be willing 
to modify their rules to allow it. 
V. CONCLUSION: RESHAPING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 Based on the foregoing discussion, the two T-shaped structures 
examined in this Article present novel yet controversial solutions to 
the problem of how to manage the growing practice of third-party 
funding from the practical, business, and legislative perspectives.345  
These two new structures would allow the funder to partner with 
either the party to the case or the law firm to provide business savvy, 
advice, and mentorship—not just money—just like the “sharks” of 
ABC’s Shark Tank television show.346 
 In relation to the larger market for legal services, experimenting 
with reshaping the third-party funding transaction in the ways 
proposed in this Article would likely increase access to third-party 
funding for both consumer and commercial clients and give parties 
and law firms more choices regarding what kinds of expertise and 
                                                                                                             
into a FINANCIAL TIMES account to access article); EY Granted Alternative Business 
Structure Licence, NEW L.J. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/nlj/content/ey-
granted-alternative-business-structure-licence. 
Global accountancy firm EY has been granted an alternative business structure 
(ABS) licence enabling it to offer legal services in the UK.  Its entry into the UK 
legal market follows that of accountancy giants PwC and KPMG, both of which 
were granted ABS licences earlier this year.  EY’s worldwide legal practice already 
has more than 1,000 people in 60 jurisdictions.  It will provide corporate, 
commercial, employment and financial services legal advice.  UK chair Steve 
Varley says: “We are offering something new.” 
Id. 
 343. See supra notes 159, 287, 339 and accompanying text (discussing the rules in the 
United Kingdom and the District of Columbia that diverge from the traditional prohibitions 
by allowing nonlawyers to become partial owners of law firms). 
 344. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 345. See supra subparts IV.A & IV.B (presenting two new T-shaped partnerships: a 
partnership between funders and parties and a partnership between funders and law firms). 
 346. See discussion supra Part I (analogizing partnering with a “shark” to partnering 
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involvement they need from the funder.347  It also would likely lead to 
competition and stratification in the litigation funding market, which 
would hopefully help reduce the price of third-party funding and give 
clients more bargaining power regarding the amount of their 
judgment, award, or settlement that would go to the funder.348  
Furthermore, reshaping the third-party funding transaction would help 
guide regulators’ choices by better defining the funder’s role and the 
funding relationships that the laws aim to regulate and encourage.349  
Finally, reshaping the transaction would likely give attorneys a clearer 
sense of their obligations regarding third-party funding under their 
professional ethics rules.350 
 The proposals examined in this Article are undoubtedly 
controversial.  Moreover, neither of the two T-shaped structures 
discussed in the Article would replace the traditional triangular third-
party funding transaction in which the funder remains a separate 
entity.351  These proposals expand the menu of available transaction 
structures beyond structures based on the triangular paradigm.  As 
explained earlier in this Article, however, the triangular structure has 
not been successful at addressing several of the potential problems 
that may arise in light of third-party funding, such as conflicts of 
interest, waiver of evidentiary privileges, and the funder’s exercise of 
control over the process.352  As potential solutions, the two T-shaped 
structures explored in this Article might address some of those 
potential problems; mitigate some of the attendant risks for the client, 
funder, and attorney; increase the alternatives available to potential 
clients of funding, including individual parties as well as law firms; 
and solve some of the regulatory challenges that accompany the 
                                                 
 347. See discussion supra subparts IV.A & IV.B (presenting the benefits and 
drawbacks of two new T-shaped partnerships: a partnership between funders and parties and 
a partnership between funders and law firms). 
 348. See discussion supra subpart IV.B.2 (discussing how diversifying the available 
structures for the third-party funding transaction will lead to a wider range of third-party 
funders). 
 349. See Shannon, Harmonizing Regulations, supra note 20, at 864-65, 867-68 
(explaining why regulators need this guidance). 
 350. Cf. ABA White Paper, supra note 32 (discussing the attorney’s existing 
obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct when third-party funding is involved in 
the case). 
 351. See supra Diagrams A & B; see also discussion supra Part II (explaining the 
features and risks of the traditional triangular third-party funding transaction). 
 352. See supra Diagrams A & B; see also discussion supra Part II (explaining the 
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traditional triangular third-party funding transaction.353   Yet these two 
potential solutions are also fraught with potential problems of their 
own.  Careful, limited experimentation would reveal whether these 
two new structures are viable, desirable additions to the menu of third-
party funding transactions or whether the triangular paradigm 
commonly in use is the best option.  Ultimately, this Article aims to 
start a conversation about rethinking the structure of third-party 
funding transactions.  This Author invites other scholars or industry 
observers to improve upon these suggestions or make new ones. 
                                                 
 353. See discussion supra Parts I & II (explaining the dispute resolution risks, 
behavioral risks, and regulatory compliance risks inherent to third-party funding and how 
these risks accompany third-party funding transactions in addition to the risks inherent in any 
financial transaction.); supra subparts IV.A & IV.B (explaining how two new T-shaped 
partnerships—a partnership between funders and parties and a partnership between funders 
and law firms—will solve many of the problems outlined in Parts I and II). 
